The logic of scientific language: the determination of the cognitive status of expressions in empirical science through the rational reconstruction of the scientific language. by Chan, Kwok Hung. & Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Philosophy.
THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC LANGUAGE
The Determinatioxi of the Cognitive Status
of Expressions in Empirical Science
Through the Rational Reconstruction





The present essay is about the problem concerning the
determination of the cognitive status of expressions in empirical
science. The method proposed here is the rational reconstruction
of the language used for their formulation.
The Introduction concerns itself with the nature of the problem
and the reason why rational reconstruction of the language con-
cerned is an appropriate method. Criteria for the adequacy of
rational reconstructions in general are proposed at the same time.
Part one studies in detail the logical structure of such
reconstructions. It outlines the structure of the language L which
is a modified version of the reconstruction proposed by Carnap
in Testability and Meaning arid The Methodological Character of
Theoretical Concepts. Carnap's qualitative theory of confirmation
for the extended observation language is also presented.
Part two of this essay is a general study about the sernantical
interpretation of the theoretical language. The traditional views
concerning the cognitive status of theoretical expression will be
studied critically. After that, the thesis of Realistic-instrument-
alism is proposed. It is the union of some instrumentalist theses
in the logical context and a realist picture in the context of
discovery.
The Final Remarks, which make up the third part of the essay,
consider first of all two criticisms against the Recieved View,
viz., the objections against the analytic/synthetic distinction
and the. observational/theoretical term distinction. And finally,
the essay is concluded with a list of some directions for the
further development of our reconstruction porgram.
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The problem this essay aims at solving is that concerning
the understanding of the cognitive status of expressions in empirical
science,
What I mean by the understanding of the cognitive status of an
expression is, roughly, the ability to answer the following family
of questions: What does it mean by saying that an expression
conveys knowledge? In what circumstances is an expression cognitive-
ly significant? What are the truth conditions of a cognitively
significant expression? How is the truth value or the probability
of the expression to be determined?
This essay proposes to take the reconstruction of the rules
of the language used to formulate an expression as a method for
the determination of its cognitive status. Usually, we only know
how to use our language but are unable to give a systematic account
of its rules. This leads to the result that it is difficult to
determine the cognitive status of an expression. If we can lay
out the rules of the language explicitly, our problem is there-
by solved, since the cognitive characteristics of an expression
are determined solely by the rules of the language of which it is
a part.
In this essay, the reconstruction problem will be considered
without paying too much attention to the problem of the application
of mathematics in empirical science.
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0.1 The Ordinary Language of Science
Let us take our use of the ordinary language as an example.
Although we know how to use it in practice, there exists no explict
rules of usage for most parts of it. Let us consider the sentence
All spiders have eight legs. We would agree that it is true, but
how about its cognitive status? Is it analytic or is it an
empirical law? If having eight legs is a defining characteristic
of spiders, then it is analytic. But there is no explicit rule
concerning this matter, and so our implicit knowledge of our
ordinary language provides no answer to the question concerning
the cognitive status of the sentence. This question can be
answered only after we have given explicit rules for the meaning
of the word 'spider'. If we choose to take having eight legs as
a defining characteristic, the sentence becomes analytic, otherwise
it is empirical.
The situation is similar for the scientific language. Although
the scientists often give definitions for some of the technical
terms they introduce, there exists no explicit rule for most parts
of the scientific language used in actual practice. As an example,
consider the sentence Atomic clocks record uniform time.
The history of science seems to suggest to us the following
picture. As science progressed, we found out that our clocks used
beforehand were not accurate enough. For example, the laws of
mechanics tell us that simple pendulums do not record uniform
time. They oscillate with different periods .L-hen they are placed
on places of different latitudes. Thus we tried to find clocks that
are more accurate, and now we have found the atomic clocks,wich record
uniform time. From this picture, the conclusion that the sentence
in question is empirical seems to follow. However, this is a mis-
take. In order to check the time given by an atomic clock
or to test the natural laws which guarantee the accuracy
f the atomic clocks, we have to measure time.
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That is to say, we must have a standard of uniform time. This would
result in a circularity if in order to know the uniform time we have
to know the laws involved and in order to know the laws involved we
have to know the uniform time.
This difficulty can be avoided if we lay down as a convention that
the atomic clocks record uniform time. That is to say, we call the time.
given by the atomic clocks uniform in order to have a.. standard for time
measurement. After such a reconstruction of the language concerned, the
sentence Atomic clocks record uniform time becomes an analytical
truth. 1
The above examples show that the rational reconstruction of lang-
uage is a means for the determination of the cognitive status of
an expression and the. present essay is a study of the problem
about the rational reconstruction of the scientific language in general
as a means to understand the cognitive status of expressions in
O2
Explication and Rational Reconstruction of a Language
What I take as the rational reconstruction of a language can be
regarded as an extension of the method of analysis called explication.
In the Logical Foundations of Probability, Carnap explains
explication as consisting in the transformation (or replacement) of a.
given more or less inexact concept (the explicandum) into (or by) an
exact one (the explicatum)o2 He proposes the following conditions for
the adequacy of an explication:
1. See Carnap (1966), ch. 8 for a detailed study of the problem
concerning the measurement of time.
2. Carnap (1950), p.3. The examples in section 1.1 are outlines of
parts of an explication of the respective terms.
empirical science.
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1. The explicatum is to be similar to the explicandum in such
a way that, in most cases in which the explicandum has so far been
used, the explicatum can be used however, close similarity is
not required, and considerable differences are permitted.
2. The characterization of the explicatum, that is, the rules.
of its use (for instance, in the form of a definition), is to be..
given in an exact form, so as to introduce the explicatum into au
well-connected system of scientific concepts.
3. The explicatum is to be a fruitful concept, that is, useful
for the formulation of many universal statements (empirical laws
in the case of a nonlogical concept, logical theorems in the case
of a logical concept).
4. The explicatum should be as simple as possible this means
as simple as the more important requirement (1), (2), and (3)
nermit.1
While explication takes linguistia.terms as its categorial domain,
i.e., objects of analysis, the rational reconstruction of a language
takes the whole language concerned as its object of analysis. A
definition similar to that of explication is as follows:
Df 0.2 The rational reconstruction of a language L i with
implicit-- rules is the transformation (or replacement-) of the
language into (or by) another one, Le, whose syntactical and
semantical rules are stated explicitly.
Since the rules for the use of a term are part of the rules of the
whole language concerned, the explication of a terms is part of the
project of the rational reconstruction of the whole language..
Similarly, I propose the following conditions of adequacy for the
rational reconstruction of a cognitive language, i.e., a language used
for cognitive purpose:
1. Ibid., P.7.
CArr 1 is a language some of whose rules are riot stated
explicitly.
CArr 2 L is a language all of its syntactical and semantical
rules are stated explicitly.
CArr 3 The field of application of L is not smaller than that of
L. in such a way that, in all cases in which L, has so far
been used, L can be used.
CArr h L is at least as powerful as L. with respect to expressive
power in such a way that, all theories expressible in
are also expressible in L.
CArr 5 L is cognitively illuminating in such a way that, the
cognitive status of all sentences (wff) of L are
determined by the explicit rules of L,
CArr 6 L is cognitively illuminating in such a way that, the
cognitive status of expressions in L_, if it is determinable
in L., remains the same in L.
CArr 7 if the conditions stated above are not thereby violated,
L should be as simple as possible. (A language L is simple
iff the rules of the use of L are simple andor the laws
and theories formulatable in L can be formulated with
linguistic simplicity.
CArr 1 ensures that L is really a reconstruction. If all
syntactical and semantical rules of L. were explicitly stated, it
would need no reconstruction, or we might call it a reconstruction
of itself. Then L can at most be an alternative to L. Nevertheless.
revision or extension of L may be needed for theoretical purpose, i.e.
for the description ofphenomena or old phenomena with greater details,
or for the formulation of new theories. An L fulfilling this purpose
may be called an alternative to, revision or extension of L but
never a rational reconstruction of L..
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The only constraint specified by CArr 2 is that all syntactical
and semantical rules of Le have to be stated explicitly. It leaves
over the possibility of alternative reconstruction of L... In particular,X.
it is not required that explicit definitions must be used for the
introduction of nonprimitive terms.
CArr-3 and 4 correspond to condition 1 for the adequacy of an
explication. Since a cognitive language is used for the description of
phenomena and the formulation of empirical generalisations and theories,
similarities between L. and Le are determined by their usability for
description and theorization. If they are dissimilar, then they will
be two different languages and the study of the cognitive properties
of one will not reveal the cognitive properties of the other.
CArr 4, 5 and 6 correspond to condition 3 for the adequacy of an
explication. A language satisfying CArr 4 is useful for the development
of knowledge, while a language satisfying CArr 5 helps us to understand
the cognitive status of expressions of Li. Moreover, CArr 6 ensures
that Le can give us an understanding of the cognitive status of Li.
We cannot have an understanding of the original cognitive status of
the sentences in Li if CArr 6 is violated.
If we have two languages which, satisfy CArr 1 to 4 to the same
degree, it would be more convenient to use the one which is simpler.
For our present purpose, which is the understanding of the
cognitive status of the expressions, the language reconstructed must
satisfy CArr 1 to 6. It is not required to satisfy CArr 7 although a
simple language may simplify our task and make our understanding
more intuitive.
Note that, since Li may contain terms and sentences that are not
cognitively significant, it is not required that any term or sentence
However,
of Le be cognitively significant.,,,in order that Le could be cognitively
illuminating, its set of empirically insignificant terms should be
identical with that in Li.
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Cognitive Status , Some General Ideas
It is required in CArr 5 and 6 that Le should be cognitively
illuminating, but it should be noted that this aim cannot be achieved
if all we have is only an Le with explicit rules . In addition , the
family of questions that have to be answered for determining the
cognitive status of an expression must be formulated precisely .
Therefore , we have to explicate the concepts knowledge , truth
condition , cognitive significance , probability etc . In this
section I shall state some general ideas about them precise formulations
would be consideredin later parts of the essay .
Knowledges are expressed by cognitive sentences , and cognitive
sentences are those which are either true or false . A sentence is true
if what is describedby it is the case , otherwiseit is false , The
truth ( falsehood ' ) conditions of a sentence is the conditions such
that if they are realized then the sentence is true ( false ) . We can
identify the cognitive meaning of a sentence as the sets of truth
conditions and falsehood conditions of it .
The - logical empiricists distinguish two kinds of cognitive
sentences : analytic and synthetic sentences . A sentence is analytic
iff its truth value is determinedby the rules of the language and a
sentence is synthetic i 19 its truth value is determinedby other means as
well . They propose that the only way to determine the truth value of a
synthetic sentence is confronting it with experience . This is certainly
the case for sentences describing our experience however , they propose
that the situation is not different for sentences about unobservables
Since we cannot observe the unobservablesdirectly , we can determine
the truth value of sentences about unobservablesonly through their
manifestationin our experience . Synthetic sentences , for the
determinationof their truth value experience is relevant , are said
to be empirically significant . If one disagrees with the loricn 1
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empiricists he should.state the way(s) by which the truth value of
cognitive sentences is to be determined.
The view of the logical empiricists is summarised in the
empiricist criterion of cognitive significance:
Df 0.3 Asentence is cognitively significant iff it is
analytic or empirically significant.
The logical empiricists tried to formulate various criteria of
empirical significance, some of which will be considered in this
essay. In the second part of the essay, I would try to formulate a
revised criterion for the cognitive significance of sentences.
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The Received View-The Proposal of the Logical Empiricist1.
The term The Received View was first coined by Putnam. I It is
used to refer to the view on the structure of scientific theories and
theoretical language worked out by the logical empiricists, in particular
Carnap, Hempel, and Nagel. The rational reconstruction of the scientific
language proposed in this chapter is a modified version of that proposed
by Carnap in his articles "Testability and Meaning" and The
Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts.
1.1 Some Features of the Ordinary Language of Science
In order to give an adequate rational reconstruction of the
scientific language that is cognitively illuminating, we have to study
at the outset the language used in actual scientific practice, call it
Lact say, to see what is the field of application of Lact, what is the
expressive power of Lact and how is Lact used. In this section, I
will state some features of Lact which are noted by the logical




Carnap notices that besides the logical and mathematical terms,
Lact contains observation terms, disposition terms and theoretical
terms as descriptive terms.1 Let us have a look on the observation
terms first.
Since the purpose of empirical science is primarily the
description, prediction and explanation of empirical phenomena, and
scientific hypotheses and theories are tested by reference to empirical
data, the language of empirical science must contain terms which are
used for the description of our direct experience. Hempel points out
that "such experiential data might be conceived of as being sensations,
perceptions and similar phenomena of immediate experience or else
they might be construed as consisting in simple physical phenomena
which are accessible to direct observation, such as the coincidence
of the pointer of an instrument with a numbered mark on a dial a
change of color in a test substance or in the skin of a patient the
clicking of an amplifier connected with a Geiger counter etc."2 The
terms used for the description of experience construed in the first
way are called "observable psychological terms" by Carnap, and
those for the description of experience construed in the second way
are called "observable physical terms of the thing language".3
1. In Carnap (1939) p.7, descriptive terms are taken as those which
designate things, properties of things or relations among things
and logical terms as those which do not designate things,
properties of things etc., but serve chiefly for connecting
descriptive terms in the construction of sentences. There are
still no generally agreed and satisfactory definitions for thesetwo concepts.
2. Hempel (1952), p.21.
3. Carnap (1936-37), p.172.
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Collectively they are called observation terms (abbreviated as
"0-terms").
The thing language is the language we use in everyday life in
speaking about the observable things around us. The observable physical
terms of this language either designate observable characteristics of
observable things or space-time-points, or are names of such observable
things. "Hard", "liquid", "blue", "coincident with", "contiguous with,"
etc, are examples of such observable physical predicates1 and the
needle of this instrument, the moon, Krakatoa Volcano, Greenwich
England, Julius Caesar, etc. are names of observable things.2 A full
sentence of these observable physical predicates asserts that a certain
thing (or group of things) has a particular observable characteristic.
Carnap distinguishes two kinds of observable psychological terms.
The first kind are observable psychological predicates in a physicalistic
language. They are attributed to a person as a thing with spatio-temporal
determination.3 He takes "Charles was angry yesterday at noon" It "I (i.e.,
this person, known as John Brown) have now a perception of red," etc.
as examples of full sentences of such predicates.4
Observable psychological predicates in a phenomenological
language is the second kind of observable psychological terms. Such a
predicate is attributed to a so-called state of consciousness with a
temporal reference (but without spatial determination, in contradistinc-
tion to observable psychological predicates in a physicalistic
language.)3 Examples of full sentences of such predicates are I am
now in a state of anger, I am now in a state of thinking about Vienna,
I am now in a state of perceiving a red triangle etc.3
1. Hempel (1952), p.22.
2. Hempel (1965), p.108.
3. Carnap (1936-37), P.172.
40 Ibid., P.173.
All these O-terms are observable in the following sense:
Explanation 1.1a A predicate P of a language L is called
observable for an organism (e.g., a person) N, if,
for suitable arguments, e.g., bw, N is able under
suitable circumstances to come to a decision with
the help of few observations about a full sentence,
say p(b),,!, i.e., to a confirmation of either P(b)w
or n-P(b) of such a high degree that he will
either accept or reject MP(b)M.
Explanation 1.1b A name nb of a language L is called observable
for an organism (e.g., a person) N, if, for suitable
predicates, e.g., P, N is able under suitable
circumstances to come to a decision with the help
of few observations, about a full sentence., P(b),
i.e., to a confirmation of either P(b)n or «P(b)n
of such a high degree that he will either accept or
reject P(b)0
Although explanation 1.1 a and! 1.1 b are not definitions they give us
a general idea, of what is meant by calling a term an 0-term. It should
be noted that a term is observable relative to an organism. For
example, red is observable for a person N possessing a normal color
sense, but not observable for a color-blind person.
These three kinds of O-terms, though all observable, have
different observability. Observable physical terms of the thing
language are intersubjectively observable. For example, everybody
with normal eyesight may under suitable circumstances observe that
the table in front of me has a white surface.
1. See Df 1.2.51.
2- Ibid.. r.1.
3. This explanation, for observable names, are formulated on the
analogy of explanation 1.1 a formulated by Carnap,
4. CarnaD (1916-17). r. 1 t
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However, the observable psychological predicates in a
physicalistic language are only subjectively observable, For example,
only John Brown can aware directly and decide whether he has now a
perception of red. Others can only confirm or disconfirm this indirectly
by observing his overt behavior. That is to say, these predicates are
intersubjectively confirmable though only subjectively observable. On
the other hand, the phenomenological language is purely subjectively
1.1.2 Disposition Terms
Words like "magnetic", "soluble", "fragile", "elastic" etc. form
a great part of the descriptive terms of Lact* They are called
disposition terms (abbreviated as D-terms), since each of them
attribute a disposition to a thing. When we say that a thing has the
disposition DSR to react to a stimulus S by the response R, we are
ascribing a general regularity in the behavior of it of such a kind
that, whenever S holds, R occurs at the thing.2 Take magnetic as an
example, if we find that an object b attracts small iron objects close
to it, we say that b is magnetic.
While we can find out whether an object is blue by direct
observation, we cannot find out whether an object is magnetic merely
by inspecting the object alone. We have to observe how it behaves
under the condition that there are small iron objects near it, If there
are no small iron objects near it, we just cannot tell whether it is
magnetic or not. To sum up, a disposition DSR is not directly observable
and we can determine the truth value of "DSR(b)" only by observing the
behavior of b under the condition S. If R is the reaction of b to S,
"DSR(b)" is true on the other hand, if R is not the reaction of b to
S, "DSR(b)" is false
1. Ibid., p.172, 173,
2. Carnap (1956), p.63.
Attentive readers may notice that, in explanation 1.1 a and 1.1 b,
a term is observable if with the help of a few observations one is able
under suitable circumstances to come to a confirmation or disconfirmatior
of a full sentence of this term of such a high degree that he will
accept or reject the sentence. Therefore, it appears that O-terms and
D-terms are on the same boat, both are observable only under suitable
circumstances. However, we may distinguish the kinds of circumstances
which are suitable for the observability of O-terms and D-terms
respectively.
For full sentences, such as Blue(b)n, Sweet(b) etc., of
observable predicates, the kind of suitable circumstances required
is that it is possible to perceive the object b by our senses. For
Blue (b), the only requirement is that there is enough light, we have a
normal eyesight and are noticing b. And for Sweet(b), having a normal
sense of taste and touching b by our tongues are sufficient for the
observation of b and for the decision of accepting or rejecting
Sweet(b).
On the other hand, in order to find out whether a given object
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has a disposition take soluble in water as another example,
mere observation of b is insufficient. There are cases in which b is
observed by us, e.g., observing a match placed on a dry table before
us, but we cannot judge by this observation that DSR(b) is true or
not. We have to observe b under the specified condition S. For soluble
in water, S is being placed into water. Only if b dissolves when it
is placed into water, can we say that b is soluble in water; or, on
- the other hand, only if b does not dissolve when it is placed into
water, can we say that b is insoluble in water.
We may summarize the above result as follows:
App. 1.1 The suitable circumstances required for determining the
truth value of a full sentence, say 0(b), of O-terms is
the possibility of perceiving the object b concerned.
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App. 1.2 The suitable circumstances required for determining the
truth value of a full sentence, say "DSR(b)", of a D-term
is the possibility of perceiving the object b concerned
plus the realization of the condition S(b).
1.1.3 Theoretical Terms
Much of the systematisation, explanation and prediction achieved
by modern science is through the construction of theories. A theory,
in contradistinction to an empirical generalisation, describes the
properties of some unobservable entities or unobservable properties of
observable things, and the interactions between these unobservables
and the observables. While empirical generalisations use 0-terms and
D-terms for the description of regularity of observed phenomena, theories
employ theoretical terms (abbreviated as T-terms), examples are
"electron", "energy level", "molecule" and "electric field" etc.
In general, the primitive T-terms are treated like terms having
direct designate and have no meaning other than designating their
designata. (Just like the word red which designates the visible
property red and have no other meaning.) However, the designata of
T-terms are unobservables, so we cannot determine the truth value of
sentences containing T-terms by direct observations. We make conjectures
about the properties of these unobservables and state them using
theoretical sentences (sentences containing T-terms as the only
descriptive terms, abbreviated as T-sentence) and mixed sentences
(sentences containing both T-terms and 0- or D-terms, abbreviated as
M-sentence. The T-sentences state the properties of or relations
between different unobservables, and the M-sentences state the relations
between unobservables and observables. As a result, we can test
assertions concerning these unobservables by testing the observable
consequences of these assertions. The observable consequences of a set
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of theoretical assertions A are the observation sentences (sentences
containing 0-terms as the only descriptive terms, abbreviated as
0-sentence) that are derivable from A with the basic conjectures
concerning the properties of the unobservables as auxiliary hypotheses.
Let us illustrate this by an example cited in Nagel (1961).1
Bohr's theory of atom states that there are atoms, and each atom is
composed of one nucleus carrying a positive electric charge and some
negatively charged electrons. The electrons of an atom circulate around
the nucleus. There is only one discrete set of permissible orbits and
the diameters of the orbits in this set is proportional to h2n2, where
h is the Planck's constant and n is an integer. The electromagnetic
energy of an electron in an orbit depends on the diameter of the orbit.
Electrons may remain in one orbit or may jump from one orbit to another.
If it jumps from an orbit with a higher energy level to one with a
lower energy level, the atom emits an electromagnetic radiation. The
wave length of the radiation emitted is a function of the energy
difference between the two orbits.
In order to test the theory, we associate a line in the spectrum
of an element with an electromagnetic wave whose wavelength can be
determined by experiment. And the wavelength of a light ray emitted by
an atom is associated with the jump of an electron from one of its
permissible orbits to another by Bohr's theory. Using this and other
assertions concerning the properties of electrons etc. and their
relations with observables as auxiliary hypotheses, we can derive
experimental laws, for example, laws concerning the series of lines
occurring in the spectrum of an element, from Bohr's theory of atom.
Then we can test Bohr's theory by testing these experimental laws.
1. Nagel (1961), p.94, 95.
1, 2 Lx a Rational Reconstruction of the Scientific
Language
In order to incorporate the 0~terras, D-terms and T-terms of L,
L, our rational reconstruction of the scientific language, should con—
tain three sublanguages; an observation language, an extended obser¬
vation language f and a theoretical language L,. In the normal
presentation of the Received View, f, and are presented
seperately; in this section, however, I shall try to present L as a




In addition to the logicail terms, L has a set of auxiliary
individual constants (1 and a finite set P of predicates.
The set C of auxiliary individual constants is defined as follows;
Df 1,2,1 a, 0 is an element of N.
b. If t is an element of N, then t is also an element of N,
c, Any other expression is not an element of N,
Df 1,2,2 a© N is a subset of C,
b. If tyt,.., are elements of G, so is
c, For any finite n, if t ,,,,,t are elements of C, so is
- I XI'
d. Any other expression is not an element of C,
Functors in L are defined in terms of the predicates, and proper
individual constants are introduced in terms of predicates as suggests
in Quine (1970). p.25.26,
1• These auxiliary constants do not stand for any individual in the
universe of discourse. They are used to provide a certain kind of
formal structure so that L may employ mathematics. This would be
explained in more detail in later sections.
Formation Rules
The formation rules of L specify the set of sentences (wffs) of L.
C. Transformation Rules
For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that a set of logical
axioms and a set of formal rules of inference, specifying the relation
direct consequence between a set of sentences and a sentence, are
givenA few syntactical terms of the metalanguage are then defined as
fn 1 1 HTJC
Df 1.2ft3 A derivat ion from a set _3 of sentences is a finite
sequence of sentences such that for each i (lin),
either S, is an axiom, or S.. is in S, or S. is the direct
consequence of some of the preceding sentences in the
sequence by a rule of inference®
Df 1.2.4 A proof is a derivation from an empty set of sentences®
Df 1.2.5 A sentence S is a C-consequence of a set of sentences- _S
iff there is a derivation from S with S as its last sentence.
Df 1.2.6 CCn(S;) is the set of all G-consequences of S.
Df 1.2.7 A sentence S is a C-theorem iff there is a proof with
S as its last sentence.
Remarkt The transformation rules are so chosen that S is a
C-consequence of S_ iff S is a L-consequence of S_.
102.2 General Semantical Concepts
An interpretation X for L is identified with an ordered couple:
where U is a non-empty set of individuals and F is a function mapping
each member of P to a relation on U having the same number of arguments
as the predicate.
1. See Df 1.2.13 for the definition of L-consequence,
Following Przelecki, with slight modifications, some semantical
terms are defined as follows.
Let us denote by U(l) the universe of the interpretation I and by
j(i) the relation mapped to P_ by F of the interpretation X,
Explanation 1,2 A sentence S is true for I iff things are such as
described by S when interpreted by I,
Df 1,2,8 A set of sentences is true for X iff every member of S
is true for I,
Df 1,2,9 Ver(l) is the set of all sentences true for the
interpretation X,
Df 1,2,10 Fls(l) is the set of all sentences false for the
interpretation I,
Df 1,2,11 I is a model of a sentence S iff S is true for I,
Df 1,2,12 I is a model of a set of sentences S_ iff X is a model of
each sentence in j3,
Df 1,2.13 A sentence S is an L-consequence of a set of sentences S
iff S is true for all models of S_.
Df 1,2.14 LCn(s) is the set of all L-consequences of S,
Df 1.2,15 Two sentences S and S are L-equivalerit iff S is a L-conse-
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quence of Sf and S' is a L-consequence of S.
Df 1.2.16 A sentence S is L-true iff S is true for all interpretations
(of L).
Df 1.2.17 A sentence S is L-false iff S is false for all
interpretations (of L),
Df 1.2,18 A sentence S is L»indet iff S is not L-true and not L-false.
Df 1,2,19 Xf I is a set of interpretations (of L), then
VER(l) is the set of all sentences (of L) which are
true for every member of I; and
FLS(I) is the set of all sentences (of L) which are
false for every member of I,
Df 1.2.20 1 is the set of all interpretations for L.
The relative concept time for X defined above is not the usual
concept of true, which is, in a sense, an absolute concept. In order
to define it, we have to identify an interpretation in 1 as the
intended (or actual) interpretation for L.Let us denote this intended
interpretation by 1. Then the following definitions are stipulated;
Df 1.2.21 A sentence S is true iff S is true for I.
Hf 1.2.22 A sentence S is false iff S is false for I..
Df 1.2.23 Ver=Ver(l); Fls=Fls(l).
By the above definition, Ver' and1 Fls denote the sets of true and
false sentences of L respectively. For the intended interpretation I_,
U(l) denotes the (intended) universe of L, and D_() designates the
(intended) designation of the predicate P of P respectively.
We can distinguish four kinds of ways which may be used to
indicate an intended interpretation for L:
a. internal vs external
b« verbal vs nonverbal
Xf we make use of other terms (or another language) for the interpre¬
tation of a term (or a language), then we are giving a verbal inter¬
pretation. Otherwise, the interpretation given is nonverbal. Ostensive
definitions are examples of nonverbal interpretations and explicit
defitions are examples of verbal interpretations.
If for the interpretation of a term of a language we use only the
linguistic devices available in that language, then we are interpreting
internally. This is the case when we stipulate that certain sentences
of the language are taken as meaning postulates for the terms concerned
On the other hand, if we use devices unavailable in the language, we
are giving an external interpretation. Ostensive definitions are
examples of such external interpretations. If we use a metalanguage
for the interpretation of a certain language, we are also interpreting
the language concerned externally. Note that all nonverbal interpreta¬
tions are external, while we can interpret a term (or a language)
externally either in a verbal or in a nonverbal way:
f tc t a r-n pi 1
using ostensive definitions nonverbal
using a meatlanguage
internal using meaning postulates
verbal
In the remaining part of this essay, X will consider only the ways
of interpreting L without the use of a metalanguage. In other words,
only ostensive definitions and meaning postulates will be used to
interpret L. The reason for this is that, in order that we can use a
metalanguage M for the interpretation of L, M must be semantically
interpreted already. If a metalanguage must be used for the semantical
interpretation of a language, we will have to go ad infinitum. Thus
either we do not have any semantically interpreted language, or it is
possible to interpret a language semantically without the use of a
metalanguage, Since the problem of the possibility of interpreting a
language using ostentive definitions and meaning postulates alone will
be encountered sooner or later, I would like to consider it explicitly
in the case of the interpretation Tor L.
1.2.3 Kow are the Terms of L Interpreted—Carnap1s Proposal
The rules of L formulated in the preceding sections are stipulated
»
in the spirit of Testability and Meaning and The Methodological
Character of Theoretical Concepts. In this section, I will state the
ways for the specification of the intended interpretation of L proposed
bv Cnrnan.
1 Przelecki tacitly follows the same course in The Logic oi
Empirical Theories.
1,2.3.1 Descriptive Primitives
Within our present framework, Carnap would stipulate that some
predicates of P should be O-terms and introduced nonverbally by
ostensive definitions; while the meanings of all other terms would be
determined internally by meaning postulates on the basis of these
observable primitives.
Section 1.1.1 states that L cannot be the language of an empirical
theory without O-terms, and Przelecki points out that we cannot link L
with our experience, i.e., identify the universe of L as the world of
physical things and interpret some descriptive constants of L as O-terms,
if we interpret L only internally using meaning postulates. He proposes
that ostensive definitions must be used for interpreting L as a
language for empirical science. If anyone disagrees with Przelecki, he
should indicate other nonverbal way(s) that could achieve the same aim.
In the rest of this paper, I sliall understand the introduction
of an O-term by ostensive definition in the following sense: An 0-term
u0 is introduced by ostensive definition iff we learn and teach how
to use it in concrete perceivable situations, and as a result 0 is
observable in the sense of explanation 1.1 a and 1.1 b. Carnap
stipulates that the observable primitives should be observable
physical terms of the thing language, since they are the only terms
which are intersubjectly observable. This ensures that L is an inter-
subieotive 1 anniap-fi.
1. Prezelecki (1969), Ch. 4.
2. Car nan (1916-17). n.172 Decision 2
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It is a consequenceof the thesis of Physicallismthat the
observable psychological predicates in a physicalistic language can
be introduced on the basis of the observable thing terms . However ,
if it is not the case , then we have to introduce these psychological
terms ostensively, since we need such terms and CArr 3 would be
violated if L does not contain them , 1
1 . 2 . 3 . 2 Definedor ReducedTerms
Carnap distinguishes three kinds of meaning postulates :
( i ) explicit definition, ( ii ) conditionaldefinition, and ( iii ) the
conjunction of theoretical postulates and correspondencerules , 2
Explicit definitions have the following form :
where. . . . . xl . . . . xn . . . . is a sentenceof L containingxj , . . . . , xn as
the only free variables .
All terms introduced by explicit definitions on the basis of the
observable primitives , which are introduced ostensively , are
eliminatable in favor of these observable primitives . Moreover , for
any given interpretationof the observable primitives , there is only
one interpretation of
Q which satisfies the explicit definition for it ,
Furthermore , the explicit definitions have no factual content in the
sense that all L - consequencesof an explicit definition D which are
expressiblewithout the term introducedby D are L - true .
For the introduction of disposition terms , explicit definitions
are inappropriate. Consider the term soluble in Water . 3 One may
1 . Ibid . , p . 173 .
2 . See Carnap ( 1956 ) . Carnap ' s bilateral reductionsentencesare
called conditional definitions here other kinds of reduction
sentencesare included in ( iii ) above .
3 . Carnap( 1936 - 37 ) . D . 144 ff .
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propose the following explicit definition for it:
(a)
where Sw(x) means x is soluble in water, P(x,t) means x is placed into
water at time t, and D(x,t) means x dissolves at time t. (a) is
inappropriate since the condition stated in the definiens is satisfied
trivially by anything which has never been placed into water throughout
its life. Suppose m was a match which I completely burned yesterday and
m had never been placed into water. Then m was soluble in water by
definition (a). However, m was made of wood and thus insoluble in water.
This reveals that (a) cannot capture our ususal meaning of soluble in
water.
One way out of this difficulty is the use of causal modalities,
end then (a) may be replaced by
(a') Sw(x) If whenever x is placed into water, then, with
causal necessity, x dissolves.
However, the idea of causal necessity is not clear enough to make this
kind of definitions unproblematic.
Carnap deals with this difficulty by the use of conditional
definitions. The general form of a conditional definition for a
disposition DSR is as follows:
(b)
where S and R are the stimulus and the response of the disposition
DSR respectively. Then Sw may be introduePri by
(c)
where P describes the experimental condition which has to be fulfilled
in order to find out whether x is soluble, and "D" describes a possible
result of the experiments. (c) means that, if any thing x is put into
water at any time t, then, x dissolves at t only if x is soluble at t,
and x is soluble at t only if x dissolves at t. Thus for our match in,
which did not satisfy the experimental condition P. (c) does not tell
us whether it is soluble or not, since the truth value of Sw(m,t) can
be determined using (c) only if P(m,t) has been true for some time t.
Nevertheless, because m is made of wood and we have the well-confirmed
law that all woods are insoluble, we can infer that m is insoluble.
In general, although it cannot be determined directly whether an object
x for which the experimental condition is not satisfied has the
disposition concerned, we can have such knowledge indirectly using well-
confirmed laws about the behavior of the kind of objects x belongs
If the sentence (x)(t)-S(x,t) is L-true or is an L~ consequence
of the theory into which Dcjr is introduced or the fundamental laws of
nature, then Lg cannot be determined for any object x and the term
DSR so introduced is useless. So Carnap does not take such conditionals
as conditional definitions. His definition for conditional definition
Df 1.2.24 A sentence of the form (x) (t)( S (x, t )-(R(x, t) =Dg(x, t)))
is called a conditional definition for Dsr provided that
(x)(t)-S(x,t) is not L-true and is not an L-consequence
of the fundamental laws of nature or the theory into which
is introduced.
12.33 Terms introduced via a Theory
The T-terms are supposed to designate unobservable entities, hence
we cannot introduce them directly using nonverbal means. Since we infer
their properties by their actions on our experience, they can be
introduced by the conjunction of a T-sentence and a M-sentence. The
T-sentence is a conjunction of the theoretical postulates concerning
the relations between the theoretical entities and the M-sentence is a
conjunction of the correspondence rules which state the interactions
between theoretical entities and observables. It may be the case that
no T-sentence is needed, but C is necessary and it must be able to
establish essential connections between the unobservables and the
observables. M-sentences which are logically equivalent to a conjunctioi
of a T-sentence and an O-sentence fail to establish such essential
connections. They function like a theoretical postulate and an empirica;
law or description Besides this, there is no other restriction on
the form of T and C.
Since, according to common sense, it is assumed that T and C are
factual stateraenments describing the factual relations among unobservables
and between unobservables and observables, the cognitive status of a
sentence introducing a T-term and that of a sentence introducing a
D-term are conceived differently, even though they may be of the same
form. Let us compare the terms soluble in water with carries a
current of less than 0.1 ampere. When we say that a thing b has a
disposition Dgp? what we ascribe is merely a general regularity in the
behavior of b to react to S by R, and the regularity between S and R
is regarded as universal, So when we say that b is soluble, we say no
more than that whenever it is placed into water, it dissolves. Since
this regularity is regarded as universal, if once b is placed into
water but does not dissolve, it cannot has the disposition 'soluble in
water1. The conditional definition for the introduction of soluble in
water is taken as analytic.
On the other hand, even if there are tests for x carries a
current of less than 0.1 ampere, let us symbolize it by A(x)u, the
result of the tests are considered as empirical indicators only. The
M-sentence M stating the connection between the test result and A(x)
is not taken as analytic. Therefore when we have a negative result of
a test for A(b), we can still insist that A(b) holds without changing
the meaning of A(x), by taking M as a factual law with a high
probability only. The meaning of this factual character of T and C
will be considered in the next chapter.
1. See Carnap (1956), p.68, 69 for a discussion of carries a
current of less than 0.1 ampere, and the differences between
T- and D-terms.
2. Reduction pairs, in general, have factual content and cannot
be considered as analytic.
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To summarize, L was characterised as a language having two sets
of nonlogical constants C and P. Some terms of P are ostensively defined
0-terms and the meaning of all other terms are determined only by the
meaning postulates.
1 .2.4 The Definition of LO LO , and LT
Carnap proposes the following definitions which are used for the
classification of descriptive terms of L.
Df 1.2.25 A sentence is said to have atomic form if it consists of
one predicate followed by some arguments.1
Df 1.2.26 A sentence is said to have molecular form if it contains
no operator.1
Df 1,2.27 A sentence is said to have generalised form if it contains
at least one (unrestricted) operator.1
Df 1.2.28 A sentence is said to have essentially generalized form
if it has generalised form but cannot be transformed into
a sentence of molecular form containing the same descriptive
predicates.1
Df 1.2.29 An explicit definition is said to have atomic (or molecular,
or generalised, or essentially generalised) form, if its
definiens has atomic (or molecular, or generalised, or
essentially generalised, respectively) form.2
Df 1.2.30 A finite chain of sentences D is called an introductive
chain based upon the class P' of predicates if (i) each
sentence in D is either an explicit definition or a
conditional definition (where "S" and R are predicates)
1. Carnap (1936-37), p.142
2. Ibid.. T).144.
for one predicate, say Q; and (ii) every predicate
occurring in the sentence, other than Q, either belongs to
P1 or is such that one of the previous sentences of D is
either an explicit or a conditional definition for it
Df 12.31 An introductive chain is called a definition chain if each
sentence in it is an explicit definition.
Df 12.32 A predicate Q is said to be introduced by an introductive
chain D based upon PJ_ if the last sentence of D is either
an explicit or a conditional defxnition for Q
Df 1233 An introductive chain is said to have atomic (or molecular)
form if every explicit definition in it has atomic form (or
molecular form respectively),
Df 1.23 An introductive chain is said to have generalised (or
essentially generalised) form if at least one explicit
definition of generalised form (or essentially generalised
form respectively) occurs in it.
Df 1235 A predicate Q is said to be an observable primitive
predicate of L if Q is an observable predicate introduced
by ostensive definition.
Df 1.2.36 An introductive chain is called an atomic (or molecular,
or generalised, or essentially generalised, respectively)
introductive chain of L if it has atomic (or molecular, or
generalised, or essentially generalised, respectively) form
and is based upon observable primitive predicates of L
1. Cf, ibid., p. 149
2. Ibid., p.150.
Df 1.2.37 Apredicate of L is called an atomic (or molecular)
predicate if it is either an observable primitive
predicate of L or is introduced by an atomic (or
molecular) introductive chain of L.
Df 1.2.38 A predicate of L is called a generalised (or essentially
generalised) predicate if it is introduced by a generalised
(or essentially generalised, respectively) introductive
chain of L.
Then we can define the set of O-terms, pure disposition terms,
extended O-terms and T-terms of L; and hence Lq, Lq, and Ly.
Df 12.39 A predicate is called an 0-term of L if it is either an
observable primitive predicate of L or is introduced by a
molecular definition chain of L,
Df 1.2.40 A predicate is called a pure D-term of L if it is introduced
by an introductive chain of L whose last sentence is a
conditional definition for it,
Df 1,2.41 A predicate is called an extended 0-term (0'-term) of L if
it is introduced by an introductive chain of L.
Df 1.2.42 A predicate is called a T-term of L if it is a member of
P but is not an 0'-term,
We may call the restriction of L to 0-term as the only nonlogical
terms Lq, the restriction of L to 0{-terms as the only nonlogical
terms Lqi, and the restriction of L to T-terms and the auxiliary
individual constants as the only nonlogical terms Lyx.
Since a language may be identified as the set of all possible




Df 1.2.43 L0 is the set of all sentences of L containing 0-terms as
the only nonlogical terms and with observables taken as
individuals.
Df 1.2.44 L0, is the set of all sentences of L containing O'-terms
as the only nonlogical terms and with observables taken as
individuals.
Df 1.2.45 LT is the set of all sentences of L containing T-terms
and the auxiliary individual constants as the only
nonlogical terms.
1.2.5 A Theory of Confirmation for LO
In Testability and Meaning, Carnap develops a theory of the
confirmability for the predicates and sentences of L01. The following
definitions concern the reducibility of the confirmation of a sentence
to a set of sentences S.
Df 1.2.46 We will say that the confirmation of a sentence S is
completely reducible to that of a set of sentences S. if
S is an L-consequence of a finite subclass of S.1
Df 1.2.47 We will say that the confirmation of a non-L-false
sentence S is directly incompletely reducible to that of
a set of sentences S. if the confirmation of S is not
completely reducible to that of S but there is an infinite
sub-class St of S such that the sentences of St are
mutually independent and are L-consequences of S by
substitution alone.1
Df 1.2.48 We will say that the confirmation of a sentence S is
directly reducible to that of a set of sentneces S. if it
1. Cf. ibid., p.141.
is either completely reducible or directly incompletely
reducible to that of S_.
Df 1.2.49 We will say that the confirmation of a sentence S is
reducible to that of a set of sentences S_, if there is a
finite series of classes of sentences S-j,».•.• 9 Sn
such that the relation of directly reducible confirmation
subsists (l) between S and, (2) between every sentence
of and Si+ -j (i= 1 to n-1)? and (3) between every sentence
of Sn and S.
Df 1 230 We will say that the confirmation of a sentence S is
incompletely reducible to that of a set of sentences S, if
it is reducible but not completely reducible to that of S.
Thus if the confirmation of a sentence S is reducible to a set of
sentences S, then the confirmation of S is either completely or
incompletely reducible to S_0
Then Carnap defines the reducibility of the confirmation of a
sentence S to a set of predicates P'.
Df 1.2,31 A sentence consisting of a predicate followed by one or
several individual constants as arguments will be called
a full sentence of that predicate,
Df 1.2,32 PSP is the set of full sentences of the predicates in P'.
Df 1.2.33 FS-P1 is the set of the negations of all sentences in FSP1.
Df 1.2.34 PS±P1 is the union of FSP1 and FS-P!.
Df 1.2,33 FSP'a is the set of all sentences which are members of
FSP' and have a as an argument.
Df 1.2.36 FS-P1a is the set of all sentences which are members of
FS-P1 and have a as an argument.
Df 1.2.37 FSP1 a is the union of FSP1 a and FS-P1 a.
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., p.l40.
Df 1.2.58 We will say that the confirmation of a sentence S is
reducible (or completely, or incompletely reducible) to that
of a class PJ_ of predicates if it is reducible to a non-L-
false sub-class of FS±P1.
Finally, the reducibility relations between predicates are defined.
Df 1.2,59 will say that the confirmation of a predicate Q is
reducible (or completely reducible, or incompletely
reducible) to that of a class P1 of predicates, if the
confirmation of every full sentence of Q with a certain
argument, Q(a)1', is reducible to that of a non-L-
false sub-class of FS±P1 a.
Df 1.2.60 A predicate Q is called reducible (or completely
reducible, or incompletely reducible) to a class P of
predicates, if the confirmation both of Q and of -Q is
reducible (or completely reducible, or incompletely
reducible, respectively) to P?
We have the following theorem:
T 1.2.1 If Q is introduced by an introductive chain based upon
P!, Q is reducible to PJ_, If the chain has molecular form,
Q is completely reducible to P__; if the chain has
essentially generalised form, nQ is incompletely reducible
Then the confirmability of a sentence and a predicate is defined.
Df 1.2.61 A sentence S is called confirmable (or completely confirm
able, or incompletely confirmable) if the confirmation of S
is reducible (or completely reducible, or incompletely





Df 1.2.62 A sentence S is called bilaterally confirmable (or
bilaterally completely confirmable) if both S and -S are
confirmable (or completely confirmable, respectively).
Df 1.2.63 A predicate Q is called confirmable (or completely
confirmable, or incompletely confirmable) if Q is
reducible (or completely reducible, or incompletely
reducible, respectively) to a class of observable
predicate s.
We have the following theorems concerning the confirmabiiity of
sentences and predicates in L:
T 1.2.2 All O-terms are completely confirmable.
T 1.2.3 All 0'-terms are confirmable,
T 1.2.4 All 0'-terms which are introduced by molecular introductive
chains are completely confirmable.
T. 1.2.5 If S is a sentence of molecular form and all predicates
occurring in S are confirmable (or completely confirmable),
S is bilaterally confirmable (or bilaterally completely
confirmable, respectively)
T 1.2.6 If S is a sentence constructed out of confirmable predicate
with the help of connective symbols and universal or
existential operators, S is bilaterally confirmable.
T 1.2.7 All sentences of LQ{ are bilaterally confirmable.
Moreover, note that if the confirmation of a sentence S is
completely reducible to that of a set of sentences S, the set of truth
conditions for S is a subset of that for And if the confirmation
of S is directly incompletely reducible to that of S_, the set of truth
conditions of S is also a subset of that for S, since there is an
1. Ibid.
Cf. ibid.
infinite subclass of jB which contains all substitution instances of
S and S is true just when all these substitution instances are true.
Therefore, if the confirmation of S is reducible to that of S,
the set of truth conditions of S is a subset: of that of And if the
confirmation of S is reducible to that of a class of predicates P 1, the
set of truth conditions of S is a subset of that of a consistent subset
of FS±P. This means that the truth conditions of S are expressible by
the predicates in P1.
By definition, a sentence is confirmable iff its confirmation is
reducible to that of a class of observable predicates, and for all
sentences of,, this class is the set of observable primitives of L.
Therefore, since every sentence of LQ, is bilaterally confirmable,
both its truth and falsehood conditions are expressible by the observ¬
able primitives of L.
The theorems T 1,2.1—1.2.7 are provable because all the meaning
postulates used for the introduction of CP-terms are either explicit
or conditional definitions. In the case of T-terms, since the form of
T.C used for their introduction is virtually unlimited, theorems
corresponding to T 1.2.2-1.2.7 are not provable in general. In view
of this, Carnap develops the concept of empirical significance for the
T-terms and T-sentences.
1.2.6 Criterion of Empirical Significance for T-terms
Since there is virtually no restriction concerning the form of
T.C used for the introduction of the T-terms, with the exception that
the T-terms and 0'-terms in C should be connected essentially by C, it
may turn out that some T-terms are unrelated to the 0l-terms and thus
empirically insignificant.
Carnap regards a term as empirically significant if it has a
positive function for the prediction and explanation of observable
events. He states two necessary conditions, one for a group of terms
to be empirically insignificant, and the other for a term to be
empirically significant. Then he proposes an explication of "empirical
significance" for T-terms meeting these two conditions.
NC1 If the set of T-terms consists of two parts, V1 and V2, such that
terms of V-j are empirically significant, while those of V2 are
empirically insignif icant, then for any two sentences, S1 and S2,
of L such that all descriptive terms of S1 belong to V1 or are
01-terms and those of S2 belong to V2, neither of the two
sentences logically implies the other, unless the implying
sentence is logically false or the implied sentence is
logically true.
This is a necessary condition for a set of terms to be empirically
insignificant.
NC2 If a term 'M1 is empirically significant, then it will be possible
to derive a sentence of L0, from a suitable assumption S
involving 'M' and other terms.
1. Carnap (1956) p.38.
2. Ibid. p.54.
3. Ibid. p.58.
This is a necessary condition for a term to be empirically significant.
By characterising the character of the suitable assumption S required,
Carnap obtains his criterion of empirical significance for T-terms,
CESR A term 1M1 of L is empirically significant in L relative
to the class K of terms iff the terms of K are T-terms, 'M
is a T-term but does not belong to K, and there are three
sentences, Sj and Sjr in L and Sq in Lq t, such that the
following conditions are fulfilled:
(a) contains 'M' as the only descriptive term.
(b) The descriptive terms in S- belong to K,
(c) The conjunction Sjv[• Sj£ «T. C is consistent,
(d) Sq, is logically implied by the conjunction S.S-.T.C,
(e) Sq i is not logically implied by S-.T.C,
CEST A term 1Mn' is empirically significant in L iff there is
a sequence of T-terms f M1 r,...., 'Mn', such that every
term'' (i=1......,n) is empirically significant in L
relative to the class of those terms preceding it in the
sequence«
Here are the considerations for the conditions of SM, SK and SQ,.
Condition (a) If contains, in addition to 1M 1, other T-terms, the;
fact that is deducible from S.S-.T.C does not prove that 'M' is
empirically significant, since this may just be due to the occurrence
of these other T-terms,
Condition (b) If SK contains T-terms other than those in IC, say. ,then
SK may connect M1 with terms in K and M may be connected in T with M1.
Thus T is strenthened in effect, and we use a supplementary postulate
- which strengthens T when testing for the significance of M, while this
1. T.C is taken as an integrate part of the rules of L, languages
having different T.C are regarded as different languages.
supplementary postulate may or may not be used in the normal use of L.
In other words, the interpretative device of L is strengthened when we
test for the empirical significance of its T-terms, while in the normal
use of L9 only the unstrengthened interpretative device is used. This
I- 1
would help any T-term which does not occur in T.C vacuously to pass
the test of empirical significance.
If some O'-terms occur in and ST_ is not L-equivalent to a
conjunction of a T-sentence and an 0!-sentence, then S is in effect
a new C-rule and the interpretative device of L is again strengthened.
If for the derivation of f another sentence of t, S'q, say,
is required, i.e., smskt,c,s' q, implies( logically, then by the
deduction theorem S.S.T.C logically implies S 1 tS r which is a
sentence of? and CESR is satisfied.
Condition (d) If the truth of T.C implies that f is impossible, i.e.,
T.C implies -Sf, then S.S.frT.C implies S?0-St and condition (c) is
not fulfilled. This ensures that the confirming evidence appealed to
are empirically possible0
Condition (d) and (e) ensure that S plays an essential pole in the
derivation of S„,
These considerations show that if the restrictions (a) to (e) are
somehow released, empirically insignificant terms would pass the test.
Thus fulfilling CEST is a necessary condition for a term to be
empirically significant.
Carnap also shows that CEST is not too wide by proving that any
term fulfilling CEST will violate NC, thus it is empirically significan
Suppose that an empirically insignificant term satisfies CEST,
there is a sequence of terms fulfilling the requirement stated in CEST.
1. A term t occurs vacuously in a sentence S iff S is logical!
equivalent to a sentence S' in which t does not occur
P• u
ke t 1M1 be the first empirically insignificant term in this sequence,
then 'M' is empirically significant in L relative to the class K of
the preceding terms in the sequence, and .S-.T.C—f where M, SK,
and Sqf are the three sentences required in CESR, are logically true.
If some terms of L are empirically insignificant, then T.C must be
logically equivalent to a T.TC, where all descriptive terms of
T11 are members of the set of empirically insignifleant terms and
those of T1 and the T-terms of C are members of the set of
empirically significant terms. Therefore S,. .T'• C' .T 1 1 —S. is
logically true, and we have S.Tff—»U, which is also logically true.
The U in the last formula is S. .T'. C 1 —f. Since all descriptive
terms in 0T' f belong to, and those in U belong to or are
0 '-terms, S.T' 1 is not logically false and U is not logically true
(otherwise S.T.C logically implies S, violating CESR(e)), NO is not
satisfied and some terms in must be empirically significant. This
contradi fits with onr a «nmn+-.-i n -n_
12.7 Criterion of Empirical Significance for T-sentences
Guided by his principle of toletance, Carnap adopts a very
liberal view concerning the problem of the empirical significance for
T-sentences. The spirit of this principle finds its full-fledged
manifestation in the concluding remarks of Empiricism, Semantics, and
Ontology:
Let us grant to those who work in any special field of
investigation the freedom to use any form of expression which
seems useful to them; the work in the field will sooner or later
lead to the elimination of those forms which have no useful
function. Let us be cautious in making assertions and critical
in examining them, but tolerant in permitting linguistic forms.
The criterion he actually proposes is as follows.
1- Carnn r() n.??1
CESS Ail expression A of is an empirically significant
sentence of iff (a) A satisfies the rules of formation
of and (b) every descriptive constant in A is an
empirically significant term (in the sense of CEST).
1. Carnap (1956), p.60.
1.3
1.3.1
The Adequacy of the Proposal
The Adequacy of,
As a result of the theory of confirmation developed in 1.2.5 the
cognitive status of expressions of, L0 is crystal clear. All sentences
of L0, are either analytic or synthetic. The set of analytic sentences
of L0, is the set of L-consequences of the definitions of the 0'-terms
and the negations of these L-consequences, and all other sentences of
L0 are synthetic. Since the truth and falsehood conditions of every
sentence of L0, are expressible by the observable primitives of L, all
synthetic sentences of L0, are strictly empirically significant.
Therefore, satisfies CArr 5 of cognitively illuminating.
CArr 2 is also satisfied by t, since all rules of, are
given explicitly either in a verbal or in an ostensive way.
Xf we do not limit the kinds of observable primitives of L, we
can take any observable term as our primitive. Since CArr 3 would be
violated only if there are observable terms not contained in(,
CArr 3 would then be satisfied trivially. However, if only observable
physical terms of the thing language is taken as observable primitives
of L, we can only judge this aspect of the adequacy of LQ t with respect
to a particular formulation of L.
The Lqt reconstructed here is only a qualitative language. It
contains no mathematical tools except the theory of counting (since
the numbers used for counting are definable in logical terms). Thus L0,
cannot be used to formulate quantitative empirical laws. In view of
this, we must extend f to a more powerful observation language L0
which may employ the auxiliary individual constants.
Carnap states that the domain D of entities admitted as values of
variables in includes a denumerable subdomain X of entities, moreover
any class or ordered n-tuple of entities in D belongs also to D. He
says that the subdomain I may be regarded as the set of natural numbers,
and based on them integers, rational numbers, real numbers, complex
numbers and various relations and functions of the numbers may be
defined. These defined entities also belong to D by D's definition. Thus
D includes all those kinds of entities needed in pure mathematics. The
set£ of auxiliary constants specified in the syntax of L may be taken
as names of these entities.
However, he adds that there is no question of the nature of these
entities, the essential service that members of C give is the
presentation of formal structures. All interpretations that can be
given for (together with C and the syntactical calculus of
mathematics) are given in the C—rules. This is essentially a formalist
view concerning the nature of mathematics, and is reflected in L by
the definition of interpretation for L: interpretations for L do not
map elements of U to members of Ce Sentences containing these auxiliary
constants are semantically uninterpreted, they are treated as
syntactical devices used for the summarisation and prediction of
empirical events. This is the problem of the application of mathematics
in empirical science, and it must be solved before the problem of the
structure of the scientific language can be solved.
Before the problem of the application of mathematics in empirical
science is solved, we cannot determine the cognitive status of all
sentences of (and L, since is a sublanguage of L).
1. Carnap (1956), p.k'
Ibid.. d. 46.
1 .3.2 The Adeauacv of L
L satisfies CArr 2 since it has explicit rules.
Carnap assumes that L is based upon a particular space-time
coordinate system. Thus the space-time points are ordered quadruples
of real numbers and are symbolised by members of Cf and space-time
regions are classes of space-time points. Since all physical, psycholo¬
gical, and social concepts are properties, relations, or quantitative
magnitudes ascribed to certain space-time regions (physical things,
living organisms or classes of such), they are expressible in L using
C« Thus L satisfies CArr 3
Since there is essentially no restriction concerning the form of
T.C used for the introduction of theoretical terms, all terms would be
introducible thereby (although a T-term so introduced may turn out to
be empirically insignificant). Therefore if a term turns out to be
not introducible by this means, it is the term itself, rather than L,
that should have our attention, Ve should find out whether it has been
given any meaning at all, and how this meaning, if any, can be given.
Therefore L should satisfy CArr 4.
Carnap recognises that his criterion CESS is wide enough to count
as empirically significant sentences'for which no observational evidence
can ever be relevant. He gives The value of the magnitude M at a
certain space-time point is a rational number, where fM1 is empirically
significant, as an example. He regards the inclusion of such sentences
as a negligible price to be paid for the great convenience of using
the whole of classical mathematics. But what is the cognitive status
of such sentences?
The next part of the essay deals with the problems of the meaning
and cognitive status of T-terms and T-sentences,
1. Ibid., p.43, 44
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2. The Cognitive Status of Theoretical Terms and Sentences
There are three major types of views concerning the cognitive
status of T-terms and T-sentences: (a) the realist view, (b) the
instrumentalist view, and (c) the descriptive view. In this chapter,
I shall try to illustrate their differences by stating their viewpoints
about the fictitious theory made up by Maxwell in The Ontological
Status of Theoretical Entities, and then their merits will be examined
critically.
Here is Maxwell's fiction:
In the days before the advent of microscope, there lived
a Pasteurlike scientist whom, following the usual custom,
I shall call Jones. Reflecting on the fact that certain
diseases seemed to be transmitted from one person to
another by means of bodily contact or by contact with
articles handled previously by an afflicted person, Jones
began to speculate about the mechanism of the transmission.
As a "heuristic crutch", he recalled that there is an
obvious observable mechanism for transmission of certain
afflictions (such as body lice), and he postulated that all,
or most, infectious diseases were spread in a similar
manner but that in most cases the corresponding bugs were
too small to be seen and, possibly, that some of them lived
inside the bodies of their hosts. Jones proceeded to
develop his theory and to examine its testable consequences.
Some of these seemed to be of great importance for prevent-
ing the spread of disease.
After years of struggle with incredulous recalcitrance,
Jones managed to get some of his preventative measures
adopted. Contact with or proximity to diseased persons was
avoided when possible, and articles which they handled were
disinfected (a word coined by Jones) either by means of
high temperatures or by treating them with certain toxic
preparations which Jones termed disinfectants. The
results were spectacular: within ten years the death rate
had declined 40 per cent. Jones and his theory received
their well-deserved recognition........ Now Jones had the
good fortune to live to see the invention of the compound
microscope. His crobes were observed in great detail, and
it became possible to identify the specific kind of microbe
(for so they began to be called) which was responsible for
each different disease©
Let us consider the different views concerning the cognitive
status of Jones1 theory before the invention of the compound microscope
The realist view is the common sense view adopted in actual scientific
practice© According to it, the word crobe is coined to refer to the
then unobservable diease-producing organisms. Jones1 theory states the
action of the crobes on our body and other properties possess by the
crobes. If there is something having those properties stated in Jones 1
theory, then it is true 5 on the other hand, if nothing has the
properties stated in Jones1 theory, it is false. In general, the T-ternn
are used to refer to the unobservables and the T-sentences are taken
to be literally either true or false by the realists.
The instrumentalists take up the view that, although the
syntax of Jones theory is similar to that of the 01-sentences, it
remains semantically uninterpreted. It is only an instrument used for
organising our experience and for ordering experimental laws about
disease contraction, transmission, etc. It is a predicting mechine of
such a kind that, if a set of O'-sentences A are fed into it, it gives
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us in return other O'-sentences which express the predictions based
on A. As an instrument it may be more or less usefull, but it cannot
be characterised as either true or false Furthermore, it would be
misleading to ask what were the entities referred to by crobe, which
is only a component of a mechine0 These questions are considered to be
as senseless as the questions asking for the truth or falsity of a fable
and the referent of a leg of a table•
In contrast to the instrumentalists, the descriptivists take
Jones 1 theory as genuine statements which can be characterised as either
true or false. However, the theory is considered as a compendious
formulation between observables that is translatable without remainder
into a set of 08-sentences, For example, There are crobes of disease
X on this article would be said to be translatable into something
like this: If a person handles this article without taking certain
precautions, he will (probably) contract disease X; and if this article
is first raised to a high temperature, then if a person handles it at
any time afterward, before it comes into contact with another person
with disease X, he will (probably) not contract disease X; and ,,,0
Moreover, T-terms like crobe are considered as shorthand notions for
a complex of observables only
The differences among these three views are summarized in the
«•—• I,•«
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(either true or false)
1. This example is taken from Maxwell (1962), p.5
2, See Nagel (1961), p»117-129 for a detailed account of
2.1 The Descriptive View
The descriptive view is associated with the conception that
science never explains anything but only describes in a simple or
economical fashion the succession and concomitance of events. Pre¬
occupied with this conception, theories are taked to be descriptions
of the courses of observable events only. Therefore theories are
considered to be translatable without remainder into sets of 0f-
sentences.
We can distinguish two interpretations of this translatability0
In the usual sense of the word translatable, a sentence in one
language is translatable into another language if and only if there
is a sentence in the latter equivalent in meaning to the given sentence.
Since meaning postulates other than explicit definitions are used to
introduce the T-terms, it seems extremely dubious that there are such
translations of T-sentences in LQf. In order to substantiate their
claim, descriptivists must give such translations for the actual
theories in science. Such programmes have never been realized, and
the descriptive thesis is at best only a doubtfully realizable programme
for further analysis.
On the other hand, we may understand translatable in a weaker
sense. Then the descriptive thesis is weakened to the thesis that for
every T-sentence there is a finite or infinite set of 0f-sentences
which is logically equivalent to it. The translation of 'There are
crobes of disease X on this article f given above is an example of such
an infinite set of 01-sentences. This emendation of the word
translatable is prompted by two considerations. In the above example,
one of the preventative measures mentioned in the translation is
raising the article to a high temperature. This certainly does not
refer to one or a certain finite number of such cases, but rather to
all cases of the same kind, which may be an indefinitely or infinitely
large class The other motive is reflected in the given translation
already s the translation has an open tail Other preventative
measures, which are still unknown, may be discovered subsequently and
should be mentioned in the translation. Accordingly, the meaning of
'There are crobes of disease X on this article 1 is determined also by
further empirical discovery and cannot be specified at any given time.
It seems strange to call such an indefinite and infinite class of
sentences a translation of a given T-sentence.
2•2 The Instrumentalist Interpretation of L
Although Carnap takes the usual ontological questions about the
reality of abstract entities and theoretical entities as pseudo-
questions without cognitive content, we can give an instrumentalist
interpretation of his viewpoint concerning LT and T.C.
He assumes that the logical structure of L (hence that of L) is
specified, but only the sublanguage L, is given semantical interpre¬
tation, all the interpretation that can be given for is given
indirectly in the C-rules. Before the C-rules are given, LT, with the
postulates T and the rules of inference, is an uninterpreted calculus.
This is essentially an instrumentalist view about the logical structure
of Lq: the syntax of Lp and Lq t is similar, but L,p remains semantically
uninterpreted.
Furthermore, what the C-rules do is, in effect, to permit the
derivation of certain sentences of, from certain sentences of and
vice versa. They serve indirectly for derivations of conclusions in,
from given premises in L,. For a deductive theory, if 0' is a In¬
consequence of O.T.C, where 0 and 0 are 0sentences, then 0—01 is a
L-consequence of T.C, Therefore, we can take a deductive theory as an
0'-sentences producing machine, and what are used directly for thei
predictions of observable events directly are the 0 '-sentences produced
by the machine. Carnap thinks that good scientific meaning can be given
to questions about the reality of something, e.g., an electromagnetic
field, by understanding the acceptance of the reality of the
electromagnetic field in the classical sense as the acceptance of a
language and in it a term, say 'E', and a set of postulates T which
includes the classical laws of the electromagnetic field (say, the
1. Carnap (1956), (l95Ca).
2. Carnap (1956), p.46. Thus Carnap would take as interpretations
for L, only degenerations of our interpretations I defined in
section 1.2.2. An interpretation 1 1 =(U', F 'is called a degenera
tion of another interpretation I=JJ,F), if U' and F« are proper
subsets of U and F respectively. Here, all individuals in U' are
observable s.
Maxwell equations) as postulates for 'Ef. And to accept the postulates
of T is to use T together with the specified rules of correspondence C
for guiding his expectations by deriving predictions about future
observable events from observed events with the help of T.C.1 Thus
T.C is considered as a predicting machine,
Xn his reply to Hempel in Carnap (1963), he denies that the T-terms
of an empirical theory refer to unobservable physical objects. Since
all L-consequences of T.C which are expressible in, are also
L-consequences of the Ramsey-sentence of T.C, we can use T.C, instead
of T.C, as the predicting machine. The profit of such a procedure is
the elimination of T-terms. He explains that although the Ramsey-sentence
does indeed refer to theoretical entities by the use of abstract
variables, these entities are not unobservable physical objects like
atoms, electrons, etc., but rather (at lest in the form of the
theoretical language which he proposes in (1956)) purely logico-
mathematical entities, e.g., natural numbers, classes of such, classes
of classes, etc. And in Carnap (1956), he says that to say that the
terms of C designate the numbers etc., gives merely the psychological
help connecting these expressions for the reader with useful
associations and images, but should not be regarded as specifying part
of the interpretation of All the interpretation that can be given
for is given in the C-rules. And the essential service that the terms
in C give, consists in the fact that they represent formal structures.
There is no question of their nature. The T-terms are thus considered
as components of a predicting machine and it would be senseless to
ask for their referents.
1. Ibid., p.k5.
2. Carnap (1963), P93«
3. Carnap (1956), p.46.
Since there is no question concerning the nature of the domain of
individuals of the variables of a T-sentence cannot be characterised
as either true or false literally, for we cannot meaningfully say that
things are such as described by the given T-sentence, In spite of this,
an instrumentalist can consistently talk of the confirmation or
disconfirmation of a theory, since a theory produces a set of 01-
sentences and the confirmation of the theory can be understood as
identical with the confirmation of this set of 0'-sentences,
Moreover, CEST agrees with the instrumentalist view perfectly.
What is required for a T-term to be empirically significant is only
the production (syntactical derivation) of an 0'-sentence, that is
to say, to be an active component of a predicting machine,
To sum up, our language L may be interpreted in an instrumental¬
ist way. The Interpretation I' given for L will then be a
degeneration of I_ with an universe U' consisting of observables and
a function F' mapping relations on U' to the 0' -terms only,Then only
Lq, is semantically interpreted with 0'-sentences properly
characterisable as literally true or false. All other parts of L, i.e.,
the T-sentences and M-sentences, are semantically uninterpreted; thus
part of L together with T.C and the formal rules of inference is only
an uninterpreted calculus. T-terms do -not refer to anything, and the
T- and M-sentences describe nothing and cannot be characterised as
either true or false.
2.2.1 Some Weaknesses of the Instrumentalist Interpretation
Carnap notices two important differences between D-terms and
T-terms:
(i) When both S and R are specified, then the disposition concept D
is thereby completely characterised in its meaning; whereas a T-term
1. Carnap ''s instrumentalist tendency is manifested more explicitly
in Carnan (1939). sections 24.25.
is never completely interpreted. That is to say, T-terms have an
open character, whenever additional C-rules or postulates are
given, the interpretation of the terms may be strengthened without
ever being cpmpleted.
(ii) It has been pointed out in section 1.2.33 already that the
regularity involving S and R, on which D is based, is meant as
universal, i.e., holding without exception; however, the situation
is different for a T-term. In the face of a negative result of a
test for a T-term, a scientist can insist that it holds, since he
has an escape clause. He may point out that the test procedure based
on S and R should not be taken as absolutely reliable, but only
with the tacit understanding 'unless there are disturbing factors'
or 'provided the environment is in a normal state. The scientists
use a T~term, 'M' say, in such a way, that for certain sentences
about M, any possible observational results can never be absolutely
conclusive evidence but at best evidence yielding a high probability.
Carnap just stops here and leaves these differences unexplained.
Let us consider first the possible instrumentalist explanation for
them. It seems to me that it would be inconsistent for an instrument¬
alist to hold that a T-term has anopen character. Since L, to-
gether with T and the rules of inference, is an uninterpreted
calculus before the C-rules are given, and all interpretations
that can be given for is given in the C-rules, thus we have no
other way to identify the identity of a set of T-terms, except by
reference to the theoretical postulates and C-rules used for their
introduction. Suppose that,...,@ is a set of T—terms, we can
interpret them by stating certain T.C. If we state a different T'.C1
instead of T.C, we would be giving a different interpretation for
,...Thus ,...when interpreted by T.C is a set of
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symbols distinct from those interpreted by T'.C', and we should use
different marks to stand for these different sets of symbols.
Accordingly, when we add additional postulates or C-rules to T.C,
we change it to T'.C1 and what we have, in effect, is a set of new
symbols interpreted by T'.C'. Hence what we are doing is replacing
LTt ogether with its set of T-term {®i'•••'® , by a new language
L,f, but not strengthening one and the same set of T-terms. In the
instrumentalist terms, we are only replacing a machine by a new one.
However, we can give a realistic account of this addition of
T-poatulates and C-rules easily. According to the realist view, the
T-terms of refer to unobservable physical objects, T describes
the properties of (or relations among) these real theoretical entities
and C describes the factual connections between these theoretical
entities with the observables. Then as we discover more and more
laws about them, our knowledge concerning them is thereby strengthen¬
ed, and this is represented by adding additional postulates or C-
rules. Therefore it is our knowledge about the theoretical entities
which has an open character, i.e., it is our knowledge, but not
the interpretation of the T-terms, that can be strengthened.
Consider next the escape clause of the scientists. This
escape clause, unless there are disturbing factors, is used with¬
out indicating what may be the disturbing factors. We admit that
there may be disturbing factors which are hitherto unknown and may
be discovered later. That is to say, the C-rules do not hold with
strict universality and are at best highly probable. Adopting a
realist view, we can take the C-rules as factual description of
the connections between the unobservables and the observables, which
hold only under suitable conditions. Therefore there may be disturb¬
ing factors which can upset these conditions, and give our C-rules
a probabilistic character. However, this course of explanation is
not available to the instrumentalists. They can only treat T.C
as a whole, regarding it as a probabilistic predicting machine
producing 0'-sentences which are at best highly probable. It is
senseless for the instrumentalists to distinguish a certain com¬
ponent of their instrument as probabilistic in character.
Maxwell points out some other difficulties of the instrumental¬
ist view. As long as a predicting machine gives well confirmed
0'-sentences, it would be acceptable to the instrumentalisrs. They
can neglect the internal mechanism of the machine completely.
However, the success of a theory, i,e., the production of a set of
well confirmed 01 -sentences, is a fact that calls for explanation.
Maxwell suggests that the only reasonable explanation is that,
a well confirmed theory consists of a set of genuine statements
describing the actual properties of the unobservables and the fact¬
ual connexions between the unobservables and the observables, and
that the unobservables to which they refer exists. Nevertheless,
this course of explanation is not open to the instrumentalists
Futheremore, Maxwell finds it acutely embarrassing to the
instrumentalist when what was once a purely theoretical entity
becomes, due to better instruments, etc., an observable one.
For the case of Jones' theory, the crobes which were once unobservabl
become observable after the invention of the compound microscope.
However, instrumentalists can deal with this by the following
contention. They may point out that the term crobe, which was
initially uninterpreted, is now interpreted ostensively or by a
suitable introductive chain after the invention of microscope.
Therefore, the internal structure of the machine has been changed
and what we are doing, in effect, is replacing and old predicting
machine by a new one
Maxwell (1962), p.18
Ibid. p.22.
Lastly, the artificial air of the instrumentalist view and its
incongruity with the common sense view and the actual scientific
practice seems to me to be the reason why most of us prefer a
realist view rather than an instrumental view whenever it is
possible.
However, in spite of these attractiveness of the realist
view, some leading philosophers of science, e.g., Carnap and Nagel
contend that the issue between the realists and the instrumentalists
is only a conflict over preferred modes of speech. Nevertheless,
it seems to me that their issue is a verbal one, only if the instrument¬
alists' contention that T-sentences cannot be characterized as true
or false meaningfully and the realist's view mat T-sentences are
genuine statements characterizable as either true or false are
equivalent. The following sections deal with the semantical inter¬
pretation of L,p, and thus clear the way for the settlement of the
realist-instrumentalist controversy.
1. Carnap (1966), ch.26; Nagel (1961), p.152.
o a tv. u i a 4- r a,
The distinction of internalexternal question advanced by Carnap
in Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology has been regarded as the
key to the solution of all significant problems in ontology by
some modern realists, e.g., Maxwell. Taking Carnap's essay as his
point of departure, Maxwell argues that, in order to speak at all
about any kind of entities whatever and thus, a fortiori, to
consider their existence or nonexistence, one must use a linguistic
framework which introduce the entities.
Carnap states that a language which is rich enough for talks
concerning the existence or nonexistence of a kind of entities
must contains first a general term for them, permitting us to say
of any particular entity that it belongs to this kind. Secondly,
it must containranging over these entities, and names (as well as
closed compound expressions, if any) for them are substitutable
for the variables. With the help of the variables and a set of
rules concerning the use of these terms, general sentences concern-
ing these entities can be formulated. For example, a language
of number theory contains the general term number, a set of variables
ranging over numbers, and a set of numberial expressions. There are
formation rules accepting sentences like 5 is a number and There
are numbers, and rules concerning the determination of the truth
value of these sentences.
For the language of empirical science, there should be rules
concerning the confirmation of its sentences. And to deal with the
problem of the existence of unobservable theoretical entities, it
would suffice if the language contains the T-terms in question and
the individual variables. For example, in a language containing the
1. Maxwell (1962), p.22.
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word electron and the individual variables, sentences like There
are electrons can be formulated.
In a language containing the required framework for a kind of
entities, questions concerning their existence or nonexistence should
be answered according to the rules of the linguistic framework.
If the framework is a logical one, these answers may be found using
logical method; on the other hand, if it is a factual framework,
the answer may be found by empirical means. These questions, for
their solution we must follow the rules of the linguistic framework,
are called internal questions by Carnap. From these internal
questions he distinguishes the external questions, i.e., questions
concerning the existence or reality of the total system of a kind
of entities. They are called external questions since those who
raises them do not intend that they could be answered in the usual
way of following the internal rules of the framework. Carnap
contends that these external questions have not been formulated in
terms of the common scientific language and thus lack cognitive
significance. He suggests that they should be interpreted as the
practical question of deciding whether or not to accept and use the
forms of expression in the framework in question, unless who raise
them supply a clear cognitive interpretation. Many factors, e.g.,
the purpose, efficiency, fruitfulness and simplicity of the use of
the language, are relevent to these practical questions of choos¬
ing a language. Thus they are not yes-no questions, but questions
of degree.
Realists like Maxwell understand their claims for the reality
of the theoretical entities in the internal sense. In The Ontological
1. Ibid., p.206, 214
2. Ib 1 ri.- n. 2()7. 2HQ
Status of Theoretical Entities, Maxwell proposes that the usual
rules for the use of real and exist are as follows:
R1 @s are real= @3 exist
R2 @3 exist=~ there are @s
R3 If we have a well-confirmed set of statements which
entails the statement There are @s, then it is well
confirmed that @3 are real J
For example, since we have an extremely well-confirmed theory, which
when conjoined with other true sentences such as There are gases,
entails that there are molecules, molecules exist
However, it should be note that, although the distinction of
externalinternal question dissolves the traditional question of the
reality of theoretical entities, it is, at best, only the first step
to a solution of the realist-instrumentalist controversy, if the
controversy is understood in the following sense: while the realists
maintain that the T-sentences can be characterised as either true or
false literally, the instrumentalists deny that they can be said to
be true or false in the sense explained in explanation 1.2 (viz
a sentence is true if and only if things are such as described by it
t
This is because, while the instrumentalists may likewise accept the
syntax of a framework, they may maintain that it is semantically
uninterpreted. Thus in spite of the fact that we can deduce
syntactically 0f-sentences from a set of T-sentences and thereby
confirm them indirectly by confirming the 01-sentences they produce,
they are neither literally true nor false. Since the syntax of the
1. Maxwell (1962), P21, 2
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framework together with its rules of confirmation are accepted by
both sides, it is not a straightforward external question. And as a
consequence of their disagreement concerning the interpretation of
the framework, they disagree on the interpretation of the answers of
the internal questions, thus it is again not a straightforward
internal question.
With reference to the above example, an instrumentalist may
agree that we do have an extremely well-confirmed theory, which
when conjoined with other true sentences such as There are gases
entails that there are molecules. Nevertheless, the sentence
Molecules exist may be regarded as a well formed formula of an
uninterpreted calculus only, hence it is neither true nor false.
To sum up, though the realists and instrumentalists may accept
the same framework, they disagree with respect to its interpretation.
Therefore, if the realists want to show that the instrumentalists
are wrong, it is their burden to give semantical interpretation to.
2.3.1 Semantical Realisn
Semantical realism is a subthesis of what is called scientific
realism. Under the assumption that there are things in themselves,
i.e., objects whose existence does not depend on any mind, the
thesis of semantical realism runs as follows:
SR (a) The theoretical predicates of all scientific theories
generally refer to factual external objects and represent
flsnprt of hhrnsfi oh iects.
1. See Bunge (1969), p.98-99, and Tuomela (1973), p.7.
(b) The meanings of theoretical concepts are in general
determined by the (interpreted) scientific theory (or
theories) in which they occur.
SR(b) is expressed more fully in the holistic thesis (m):
(m) The meanings of the extralogical predicates of a
formalised scientific theory are in general determined
by the syntactical formation rules, logical and
mathematical axioms as well as the rules of derivation of
the language of the theory, by all the scientific axioms
(and theorems) of the theory and by the adopted
semantical rules,
In detail, semantical realism assumes that the nonlogical terms
occurring in scientific theories are normally capable of designating
factual concepts such as the concept of specific gravity or that of
latent aggression etc. Such concepts are to be contrued as objective,
at least in the senses of being non-experiential and, furthermore,
generally accepted and internalised in a scientific community. And
a scientific term occurring in a theory is said to have cognitive
significance if it designates a factual scientific concept, which
has been accepted by a scientific community to represent an objective
aspect of the world.
Some of the components relevant to the interpretation of a
scientific term, e.g., 'latent aggression', can be represented in a
meaning diagram.
1. Tuomela (1973), p.8. The thesis of semantical realism considered
in this section is proposed by Tuomela.
2. Ibid., p.122, 123-
3. Ibid., p.120.

















Tuomela explains that this kind of diagram generally incorporates
two kinds of semantic assumptions for the concept in question:
(a) a rule of denotation stipulating what the concept
refers to;
(b) a semantic assumption specifying which aspect of the
referent the concept in question represents,
Thus the concept 'latent aggression' refers to human beings and
represents (the state of) latent aggression
Following the thesis (l), Tuomela gives the following
semantical rule for 'latent aggression':
RX 'Latent aggression' designates the concept of latent
aggression as elucidated by the theory T incorporating
the term latent aggression.
It should be noted that RI is stated in a metalanguage, Discontentec
with the method of interpreting a theoretical term internally,
Tuomela, as well as some other philosophers of science, appeals to
the use of metalanguage. However, RI will serve its purpose, i.e.,
gives a semantical interpretation of the term in question, only
1. Ibid.
2. Cf. Ibid.. d.12
if the metalanguage used is a semantically fully interpreted
language containing either the term or its translation. As is pointed
out in section 1.2.2, this metalanguage itself, needed to be
interpreted semantically. If for the semantical interpretation of
a language another semantically interpreted metalanguage is always
needed, we have to go ad infinitum. Therefore, either we can give
semantical interpretation to a language without the use of another
metalanguage, or else we can have no semantically interpreted
language at all.
With respect to the realist-instrumentalist controversy, the
instrumentalists might deny that the theoretical part of the
metalanguage used is semantically interpreted, and regard the
theoretical part of the metalanguage as another uninterpreted
calculus. Therefore, in order to convince the instrumentalists, a
realist should show that some theoretical language can be interpreted
semantically without the use of a metalanguage. That is to say, he
has to show how the theoretical part of a language can be semantically
interpreted in a nonverbal or internal way.
If we do not want to delay the treatment of the problem
concerning the semantical interpretation of, we should try to
interpret it nonverbally or within L.
2.3.2 Meaning Postulates
In this section, we will consider the problem of the interpre¬
tation of a language internally using meaning postulates.
If both verbal and nonverbal means are used for the actual
introduction of a term, it should be possible to distinguish these
two components explicitly by coining another term to stand for the
concept that is introduced ostensively and then define the original
concept on the basis of this newly defined one. Therefore, I stipulate
that our language L should be constructed in such a way that every
descriptive term is introduced either ostensively or internally, but
not both.
In section 1.2.2, it is explained that the internal introduction
of a certain term can make use of only those linguistic devices
available in the same language. In general, these are the ostensively
introduced terms and the logical and mathematical tools. Thus the
internal interpretation of a term is a problem relative to the
original language into which the term is to be introduced. In the
rest of this section, this problem will be considered with respect
to a higher order language (L is assumed to be a higher order
language). Furthermore, if the ostensively interpreted primitives of
L are insufficient for the introduction of a term, it is assumed
that other suitable ostensively introduced primitives will be
supplemented.
To interpret a set of descriptive terms internally is to
stipulate a set of meaning postulates for them. Meaning postulates
are used to restrict the intended interpretation of the terms. To
take a set of sentences MP as meaning postulates for a set of terms
P. is to stipulate that the terms in P. are to be understood in such
a way that the sentences in MP are true, no matter how the actual
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world turns out to be like.
We may distinguish two aspects of the meaning of a term, Q say.
The intension of Q is the property (or relation) designated by Q,
while the extension of Q is the set of objects (orn-tuples) to which
Q applies.
Let us consider at the outset a simple case. Suppose a term Q
is introduced by an explicit definition of the form (x)(Rx=Qx), where
R is an ostensively introduced predicate. If Q. is to be understood
in such a way that (x)(Rx=Qx) is true for the intended interpretation
1. See Carnap (197)» section and 5 for a detail account of
these two concepts.
1, all permissible interpretations for Q must have the same extension
as R. However, since the predicate R is interpreted only ostensively
(thus only its intension and not its extension would be specified,
if it is a general term), the fulfilment of this requirement could
be gauranteed only if Q is given the same intension as R»
Consider next the introduction of a disposition term D by
a conditional definition of the form (x) (t)( S (x, t)— (R(x, t) =D (x, t))).
The restriction of this MP on the intended interpretation of Dc is
that its intention must be specified in such a way that Dc applies
to those at the moments at which condition S is realized and R is
their reaction to S; and -Dg to those things at the moments at which
S is realized and -R is their reaction to S. Thus the intended
interpretation for FgR is not uniquely specified by a conditional
definition. Permissible interpretations, for which MP is true, may
interpret those things for which the condition S is not realized
differently. In order to narrow down the class of intended interpre¬
tations, we may state more meaning postulates which capture our
ordinary use of DSRo For example, if it is a well-confirmed law
that all things having certain condition A react to S by R, all those
having certain condition B react to S by -R and nothing has both A
and B. then
may be added as further meaning postulates. If (x)(t)(A(x,t) v B(x,t))
is true, then the interpretation of FgR is determined uniquely.
Meaning postulates other than explicit and conditional definitions
usually have factual content. That is to say, they have as their
L-consequences non-L-true sentences which can be expressed using
the original terms only. Let our set of predicates P be the union of
two disjoint sets and where PQ= pi is a set of
observable primitives and the terms of PT= -fP,,, p I are to be
introduced by a postulate Z. Let Lr denotes the restriction of L
having as its set of nonlogical terms. Furthermore, let I be
an interpretation for the predicates in Pq, and I for those in P.
Ve will denote by IO that part of I which is an interpretation
for Pq. If 10= Iq, I will be called a prolongation of Iq. An
interpretation Iq will be said to be admitted by a set of sentence Z,
if and only if there is an I such that 10=1 and Z is a subset of
Yer(l). Then the concept 'non-creative with respect to PL is defined
as an explicatum of having factual content.
Df 2.3«1 The set of sentences Z in L will be said to be non-
creative with respect to P (or Lr) iff every interpreta¬
tion I for P-. is admitted by Z.
If Z is non-creative with respect to PQ, then the stipulation
that Z must be true for the intended interpretation does not limit
the interpretation for P, since every I can be prolonged to an I
for which Z is true. Thus the truth value of any sentence expressible
in terms of P only is determined solely by the intended I_, which
can be chosen in a way independent of the fact that Z. is stipulated
as the meaning postulates for the other terms. In a word, Z does not
imply anything about the empirical world.
On the other hand, if Z is creative with, to, there are some
Iq which are prolongable to an I for which Z is true. Thus the
stipulation that Z is taken to be the meaning postulates would reject
as unintended those I with an IO not admitted by Z. It is our
usual practice that PQ is given ostensive interpretation, I say, at
the outset and P is then introduced on the basis of these already
interpreted terms of P. Since P is interpreted ostensively, the
answer to the question of the admissibility of 1 by Z cannot be
determined in advance, and it may turn out, as a matter of fact, that
1 is not admitted by Z. Then the stipulation of Z as the meaning
postulates for would force us to change our original interpretation
for Pq». Thus creative meaning postulates are unacceptable for the
introduction of new terms on the basis of a set of previously
interpreted terms.
Section 1.2.33 states that the T-terms of L, may be introduced
by a postulate T.C. For the language of empirical theories, the T.C
postulated must have empirical content. That is to say, T.C is
creative with respect to the set of observables primitives Pq.
Therefore T.C cannot be used as meaning postulates for the T-terms.
In The Problem of Analyticity Przelecki and Wojciki present
several standard methods to deal with this difficulty.
The first method consists in a restriction of the use of Z
as meaning postulates. If the original 1 for P is not admitted by
Z, Z will not be used as meaning postulates. That is to say, Z
determines the intended interpretation for P only if the I_ is
admitted by Z; and if 1 is not admitted by Z then the interpretation
of PT is not determined in any way. This may be accepted as a possible
way out since, in actual practice, those Zs with false empirical
consequences must be rejected or revised, and only those which have
true empirical consequences are to be accepted. However, if it turns
out, as a matter of fact ?that some of the empirical consequences of
the Z accepted provisionally are false, then we have to interpret P
all over again.
Other kinds of methods presented in The Problem of Analyticity
consist of the abstraction from Z an analytic and synthetic component.
Let us call these kinds of methods the method of A-S Reconstruction,
A creative Z is considered as consisting of sentences which fulfill
1. Przelecki and Wojciki (1969)
2. Ibid., p.383.
both the function of stating some empirical fact and the function of
stipulating the meaning of the terms being introduced.
It is proposed that the synthetic component ZS of Z must
posses two properties: i) ZS must not impose any condition upon the
way of interpreting P, and ii) ZS and Z must not differ in what they
say about the reality being described by £q• Definition 2.3.2- is the
formal definition for ZS.
Df 2,3.2 A set of sentence ZS of L is an synthetic-component of
the set of postulates Z iff for every interpretation I
of P, I is a model for ZS iff IO is admitted by Z,
On the other hand, the analytic component ZA of Z is required
to satisfy the following two conditions: i) ZA, taken as a set of
meaning postulates for P must endow them with the same meanings
as they had by virtue of Z, ii) ZA must be deprived of any factual
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content. Df 2.33 is proposed as the definition for ZA.
Df 2.3.3 A set of sentences ZA of L is an analytic component of
the set of postulate Z iff ZA is non-creative with
respect to P, and for every interpretation I of L if
IO is admitted by Z5 then
I is a model of ZA iff I is a model of Z.
We have the following theorems concerning the properties of ZS
and ZA.
T 2.3.1 If ZS and ZS1 are both synthetic-components of Z, then
ZS is L-equivalent to ZS1.
T 2.3.2 If ZS is an synthetic-component of Z, S a sentence of Lr,
then S is anL-consequence of Z iff S is a L-consequence
of ZS.
1. cf. ibid., p. 387,
2. Cf. ibid.. n. 218.
T 2.33 If is an synthetic-component of Z and S is an
L-consequence of ZS, then there is a S1 of Lr such that
S=S1 is L-true.
T 2.34 If ZA is an analytic-component of Z, S is a sentence of
Lr and is anL-consequence of ZA, then S is L-true.
T 2.33 Z is an analytic-component of Z iff 0 is an synthetic-
component of Z.
T 2.36 If ZS is an synthetic-component of Z, ZA is an analytic-
component of Z, then Z is L-equivalent to ZSuZS.
Carnap proposes a general method for the abstraction of an
analytic-and an synthetic-component from any finite set of postulate
Z. Let Z represents a conjunction of the elements of Z, then the
Ramsey-sentence of Z, denoted by Z, is defined as follow:
where Z(v ,....,v) is the formula obtained from Z by proper
simultaneous substitution of predicate variables v..... ,v for the
occurrences of P P, respectively. Carnap proposes to take
as an synthetic-component of Z, and the so-called Carnap-sentence
R 0 o
Z—Z, denoted by M Z, as an analytic-component of Z. We have the
following theorems for Z and Z:
1 2.37 If the set of postulates Z is finite, then Z is an
synthetic-component of Z.
T 2.38 If the set of postulates Z is finite, then Z is an
analytic-component of Z.
T 2,39 If the set of postulates Z is finite and ZA is an
analytic-component of Z, then Z is an L-consequence of
ZA P
1. Cf. ibid., p.388.
2. Carnap (1963), (1966), Ch. 28.
3. Przelecki and Wojciki (1969)1 p.388, 389-
Theorems 2.3.7 and 2,3.8 show that we have a general method
for the construction of an synthetic- and an analytic-component
for a finite Z, however it is not the case for an infinte set of
postulates. We do not know even whether these components exist. Since
the first method does not encounter such difficulty, we may adopt
it for the case of an infinite set of postulates.
While T 2,3.1 states that any two synthetic-components of Z
are L-equivalent, it can be proved that there are in general more
than one analytic-components for Z and they may be non-L-equivalent
to each other. Consider a hypothetical set of postulates for the
term 'A1. Let the English translation of Ax be x carries a current
of less than o,1 ampere, Gx means a certain kind of galvanometer
is connected in series with x, Dx means the deflection of the
galvanometer connected in series with x is less than a certain degree,
Vx means a copper sulphateis connected in series with x, and Wx
means the increase in weight of the cathode of the voltameter connected
in series with x after a certain time is less than a certain gram.
Let (x)(Gx-»(Dx=Ax)) and (x)(Vx—(Wx=Ax)) be the el ements of the set
of postulates for the T-term A. Note that the conjunction of the
two are L-equivalent to (x)(Bx-Ax).(x)(Cx--Ax), where Bx is the
short for Gx.Dx v Vx.Wx and Cx is the short for Gx.-Dx v Vx.-Wx.
Therefore we can take Z as (x)(Bx-Ax).(x)(Cx--Ax).
Since (x)-(Bx.Cx) is L-equivalent to RZ, we can use it as an
synthetic component of Z by T 2.3.7. It can be proved that each of




ZA| ((x)-(Bx.Cx)-(x)( Bx—Ax)).( (x)-(Bx.Cx)-(x) (Cx~-Ax)]
ZAb is L-equivalent to Z, and each two of ZA1, ZA2, ZA3 and ZAf are
not L-equivalent to each other. Both ZA2 and ZA3 have ZA1 as an
L-consequence and ZA4 is an L-consequence of ZA1. In general, the
converse does not hold. T 2.39 shows that Z is the weakest of all
possible analytic-components of Z.
It seems to me that this method of reconstructing an synthetic-
and an analytic-component for Z violates CArr 6. Although the L, i.e.,
our L, reconstructed in this way may be simpler and more fruitful,
thus fulfilling CArr 7, 3 and k, it does not correspond to the actual
use of L. With respect to our hypothetical Z for A, the method of
A-S reconstruction would require that one of ZA1 to k or other
permissible analytical-component of Z should be taken as meaning
postulate, that is to say, taken as true no matter how the actual
world turns out to be. For example, if we take ZA1 as our meaning
postulate for A, and the result of a test for A with respect to a
certain wire b is that Gb but -Db, then we are compelled by ZA1 to
accept -Ab. However, as pointed out in section 1.2.3, Carnap notes
that a scientist may still assume that Ab in spite of the negative
result, since he has an escape clause unless there are disturbing
factors. It must be emphasized that this course is not open to him
if ZA1 is taken as meaning postulate. According to actual scientific
practice, these corresponding rules (x)(Gx—£ (Dx=Ax)) and
(x)(Vx—(VxSAx)) are regarded as factual statements which hold only
under normal conditions. It seems to me that this is the origin of the
escape clause. Even if they were the only postulates concerning A, they
would be taken as wholely synthetic, from which no analytic-component
can be abstracted-
1. Ibid., p.390, 391.
2. Carnap (1956), p.68, 69.
3. The nature of this factual view will be considered in the
ri n V f o i f A A
Let us consider, next, an important character of the use of meaning
postulates.
In Theoretical Concepts, Tuomela proves an important theorem
which shows the weakness of the use of meaning postulates for
introducing T-terms,
T 2.310 Assume that a postulate Z has a model M such that in
the set of individuals U= V o W of M, the subset V has
the following property: no element of V belongs to the
denotation of any predicate of P_. Then Z has another
model M which is isomorphic with M and in whose set
of individuals U1 =V 1 U V the subset V' is a set of
numb ersJ
The condition stated in the theorem is fulfilled in general
for any empirical theory about unobservables, since the unobservables,
which are elements of V, do not belong to the denotation of the
0-terms. It would be useless for us to characterise the denotation
of the T-terms as physical entities. For example, we may want to add
that all electrons are physical entities. Since the denotation of
the term physical includes unobservables, it is another T-term,
To state that all electrons are physical entities amounts to adding
one more postulate, namely (x)(x is an electron-- x is physical)
to the set Z. We obtain then another set of postulates Z', to which
T 2.3.10 applies as well. Thus the method of introducing the T-terms
by the use of (meaning) postulates fails to exclude unintended
interpre tations.
Furthermore, although the stipulation of a set of postulates
for the interpretation of the T-terms do give a set of more than
one permissible interpretation, can we selectone element from this
class as the (or my) intended interpretation? It seems to me that
this cannot be done for the simple reason that the denotations of
1. Tuomela (1973)» p.138: cf. Winnie (198?).
the 'F-terms are unobservables, so we cannot interpret them non-
verbally by ostensive definitions. Since a sentence S is true if
and only if things are such as described by S when interpreted
by an intended interpretation,1 and we fail to give an intended
interpretation for, the T-sentences and M-sentences cannot be
characterised as either true or false in the above sense. Therefore,
unless and until the realists can give semantical interpretation to
PT by some other means, the realist view concerning the cognitive
status of theories about unobservables is untentable.
2.4 Realistic-Instrumentalisim
In this section I shall propose a realistically inclined
instrumentalist view called "Realistic-instrumentalism". It seems
to me that it can retain the advantages of' the instrumentist as
well as the realist view and avoid their difficulties at the same
time.
Let the set P of descriptive predicates of L be the union
of three disjoint classes 0, 0" and T. Let MP=M' uM" be the meaning
postulates stipulated by the user(s) of L, in which M" contains
meaning postulates for the terms in 0 which are introduced on the
basis of 0. M" must be noncreative with respect to 0. On the other
hand, M' is a set of sentences containing terms of T as descriptive
terms but no term of 0 or 0", It is the set of meaning postulates
for T. For example, M' may contain the definition of current density
"J" in terms of current "I", As long as a term of T remains un-
observable, its meaning cannot be defined on the basis of 0 by
meaning postulates. Terms introducible on the basis of 0 are all
disposition terms in the wide sense. Thus M1 contains only sentences
relating the meanings of the terms in T to each other,
I Instrumentalist Theses in the Logical Context
la The intended interpretation I. for L is an ordered
couple Ui, Fi, where IF is a set of observables,
Fi is an one to one function mapping each term in O
and 0 to a relation on IF having the same number of
arguments as the predicate, and M is true for Ii.
This thesis is supported by the observation that both nonverbal
and internal means fails to give the theoretical terms an intended
interpretation and the use of a metalanguage leads to the same
problem eventually since we have to interpret the first metalanguage
either nonverbally or internally. As a consequence of la, we have
Ib and Ic.
Ib L0, the set of sentence having predicates interpreted
by I as nonlogical terms, is a semantically interpreted
language. Sentences of this L0 are either true or
false in the sense that,things are such as described by
them when they are interpreted by I iff they are true.
Ic LT., the set of sentence in vhich terms uninterpreted
by Ii occur nonvacuously, is only an incompletely
interpreted language schema. Sentences of L,, are
neither true nor false.
Df 2.4.1 A sentence S is called an A-consequence of a set of
sentences S iff every model for S and M is also a
model for S.
Df 2.4.2 A sentence S in L0, is said to be A-true (A-false)
iff S (-S) is an L-consequence of M,
Df 2.4.3 A sentence S of f is said to be potentially A-true
(A-false) iff S (-S) is an L-consequence of M,
As long as terms in T remain uninterpreted, sentences of LT,
are neither true nor false. However those sentences of LT, which
are L-consequences of M would become A-true (A-false) if the terms
in T are interpreted, this is the reason why they are called
potentially A-true (A-false).
Df 2.4.4 A sentence of L is said to be analytic iff it is A-true
or A-false or potentially A-true or potentially A-false.
Df 2.4.5 A sentence of L is said to be synthetic iff it is not
analytic.
Df 2.4.6 A sentence S is called an 0'-consequence of a set of
sentences S iff it is a sentence of L0, and is an A-
consequence of S2.
1. A term occurs in a sentences S nonvacuously if S is L-equivalent
to another sentence in which the term in question does not occur.
2. bee section 1.2,4 for the definition of L0.
Df 2.4.7 The empirical content of a set of sentences _S is the
set of all 0 1 -consequences of•
Df 2.4.8 A set of sentences S_ is said to have empirical content
iff the empirical content of S is nonempty.
Df 2.4.9 CEST
Df 2.4.10 A sentence having no empirical content is said to be
pragmatically significant iff it is a sentence of a
certain kind, K say, and L would become less convenient,
less simple, less efficient if sentences of kind K were
excluded from L.
Sentences like The value of the magnitude M at a certain space-
time point is a rational number, for which no observational
evidence can ever be relevant, are classified by Carnap as empirical¬
ly significant. The reason he gives is that great convenience is
gained by the use of classical mathematics and the sentence in
question becomes a sentence in L as a consequence of the inclusion
of the mathematical language in L. Thus the distinction made in
CESS is not a purely theoretical (cognitive) one. The above defini¬
tion of pragmatically significant tries to single out this
pragmatical component in CESS explicitly. The intention of CESS to
include sentences whose inclusion iii L is justified only prag¬
matically is expressed explicitly in the definition for cognitive
significant:
Df 2.4.11 A sentence in L is said to be cognitively significant
iff it is analytic or has empirical content or is
pragmatically significant.
So long as we recognise that Lt is only a partially interpreted
language schema (with T uninterpreted) and is used like an uninter¬
preted calculus for the production of 01 -consequences, its use in
cognitive discourses raise no puzzle.
Id A theory consists of a set of sentences in L, it is a




A theory can be confirmed indirectly by
confirming: its 0i-consequences. If it is a
set of sentences in Lq„, it is either true or false,
otherwise the terms true and false are undefined.
Theories having the same 0'-consequences are evaluated
with respect to their simplicity, convenience and
heuristic value for further development.
Thesis If states the reason why we may prefer to use a theory
instead of its 01-consequence.
In order to make a statemet, we have to use a semantically
interpreted language. We do not success in making any statement if
we simply make some noise or draw some ink marks on a paper. These
noise or marks have zo be semantically interpreted. And it is due
to our failure to give L, an intended interpretation that we are
forced to adopt an instrumentalist views concerning theories
formulated in,. However, it seems to me that we can adopt a
realist picture about theories in the context of discovery, and
thereby retain the advantages of the realist view.
II Realist Picture in the Context of Discovery
We imagine that a theory formulated in does describe
some states of affairs by associating some more or less
familiar conceptual or visualizable material to the
terms in T; and as our technology developes, we try
to give them ostensive definitions or introduce them
on the basis of newly interpreted terms.
Although a full-fledged instrumentalist may regard the differ-
ences between a theory and an 0'-sentences producing machine of
other nature as differences which make no difference, their values
It should be noted that the realist picture is only a picture in
the context of discovery, it is hot a realist thesis in the strict
sense. It is incorporated in Realist-instruinentism for its uses
in the context of discovery. The core of Realist ic-ins t runiental ism
is the instrumentalist theses in the logical context.
76
differ greatly in the context of discovery along two lines of
development: theoretical development and subsequent interpretation.
Since a theory, which is a syntactical tool, are sentences
of a partially interpreted language schema, it may become factual
statements if we success in giving the T-terms semantical interpret-
ations subsequently by defining them ostensively or by introducing
them on the basis of other newly interpreted terms. For example,
the T-term crobe coined by Jone was given subsequent ostensive
definition after the invention of compound microscope. This kind
of subsequent interpretation cannot be given for other 0'-sentences
producing machines of different natures. Therefore LT, is a
potential L0„, and sentences (as well as theories) in LT, are
potential truth-value bearers.
In the remarks on the open character of T-terms and the
escape clause of the scientists, it is argued that the C-rules and
most T-sentences, except those taken by the users of L as meaning
postulates, should be viewed as factual statement. This point is
reflected in the definitions for analytic and synthetic, and
as a consequence of which all C-rules and most T-sentences are
classified as synthetic. However, can we say that these sentences,
which are viewed as factual, are true or false in some sense of
the words? And how shall we assign these truth values to them?
In the first place, theories having some false 0'-consequences
may be characterized as Fd, meaning false in a degenerated sense.
This characterization is justifiable since we cannot give a true
interpretation to such theories and they can never become true
sentences in an extended L0„ of the original L0,,. In The Factual
ontent of Theoretical Concepts, Rozeboom claims that having false
P -consequences is the only way to refute -a Ltieory, and we can
only interpret a theory in such a way that the theory turns out to
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be true for that interpretation. 1 Consequently, theories having the
same empirical content have the same truth value. This seems to be
incompatible with our view that the C-rules and some T-sentences are
"factual". In what follows, I suggest a way to assign different
degenerated truth values to theories of the same empirical content.
Let T1 and T2 be two different theories formulated in LTt. Suppose
we success in giving LTt a semantical interpretation for which T1 is
true and T2 false, then the degenerated truth value Td is assigned
to T1 and Fd to T2. It should be note that these degenerated truth
values are assigned only to the original theories formulated in the
partially interpreted language LTt and they cannot be characterised
as either true or false in the literal sense. So long as we fail to
give LTt semantical interpretation, we can distinguish T1 and T 2 only
by their pragmatic values. This way of assigning degenerated truth
values to theories seems to correspond to actual scientific practice.
Another benefit gained by viewing the C-rules and some T-sentences
as factual is that, it would be easier for the scientists to change
the internal structure of their machine. This can be accomplished by
imagining that some part of the theory is false and should be replaced
by other true statements describing the actual properties of the
theoretical entities.
Associating familiar conceptual or visualizable material to the
T-terms helps us to make conjectures about the properties of the
unobservables and their relations with the observables. That is to
say, it helps us in the construction of our syntactical tool. For
example, imagining the molecules of gases as billiard-balls leads
us to the conjecture that Newton's laws are also applicable to them,
and the momentum imparted by them when they hit the walls of the
container is then associated with their pressure. Thus the C-ru1P
1. See Rozebooni (1963), part II and III
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connecting the average kinentic energy and the pressure of the
gases is proposed. This kind of association can be viewed as
interpretation in some degenerated sense. They can be given for
theories very easily since the components of a theory are expressions
of a language schema which may be given proper interpretations.
Such associations can hardly be given to 0'-sentences producing
machines of other natures.
To sum up, the Realistic-instrumentajism proposed here is the
union of an instrumentalist thesis in the logical context and a
realist picture in the context of discovery.
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3. Final Remarks
In this last part of the essay, some criticisms concerning
the Received View will be considered, they seem to be applicable
to our present program as well. After that, I shall conclude the
essay with a list of some directions for the further development of
our reconstruction program.
3.1 The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction
There are two kinds of criticisms concerning the so-called
analytic/synthetic distinction. One kind concerns the notion of
analytic, and the other concerns the notion of synthetic.
With respect to the definition of synthetic as nonanalytic,
as proposed in this essay, the second kind of criticism against
the distinction can be formulated as follows: It is not the case
that all synthetic sentences in cognitive discourses have empirical
content. It should be noted that this is no criticism for our
present program as well as the final version of the received view
proposed in Carnap (1956), since both CESS and our present definition
for cognitive significant admit as cognitive significant sentences
which have no empirical content and are nonanalytic,.
The first kind of criticisms concerns four aspects of the notion
analytic:(a) the intelligibility of the notion "analytic", (b) the
existence of empirical, behavioristic criterion for the application
ofnanalytic to natural languages, (c) the revisability of analytic
sentences, and (d) the value of regarding some sentences of a
language as analytic.
1. The definition of "empirical content" in section 2-3-3 is an
explication of the concept of synthetic as envisaged by Quitie
and Putnam in Quine (1951) and Putnam (1 962a). See Suppe (1x)77)
p.67- 80, Quirle( 1951) sections 5, 6; acid PtiLnatt
(a) In Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Quine argues that no intelligible
and noncircular definition of the term analytic can be given. It
has already been pointed out by Strawson and others that he has
not made his case. At best what he has shown is that a number of
different attempts to define the term analytic do not work.
In what follows, I shall consider briefly his discussion on
semantical rules and give one more definition of analytic which
is in line with Quine's argument,
Quine imagines that analytic statements may be characterized
as those which may be turned into a logical truth by putting
cognitive synonyms for cognitive synonyms, but he argues that we
have to use analytic in order to explain the notion cognitive
synonym, hence a circularity results. However, the definition
given below for cognitive synonym is independent of the notion
analytic,
Df 3.1.1 Two expressions E and E are cognitive synonyms iff E
and are used in such a way that the truth value of
any two sentences and, in which E and E are
used but not mentioned and is obtainable from Sp
by replacing some occurences of by occurences of E
or some occurences of E0 by occurences of E„, as alwavs
equal by stipulation or as a consequence of those
stipulations for other expressions.
For example, bachelor and unmarried man are cognitive synonyms
by stipulation.
Since our definition of analytic given in this essay appeals
to the semantical rules of L, I shall consider here Quine1s argument
against this kind of definitions for analytic.
1. Orice and Strawson (1956), Suppe( 1977) v p.72
2. Quine (1951)» section 3.
3. Df 2.,h.
Quine argues that an artificaJ language, eg., our language L,
may have a definition for the set of analytic sentences of the
language, but the word analytic in the definition is one ve do
not understand. We understand what expressions the rules attribute
analyticity to, but we do not understand what the rules attribute to
those expressions. If we do not understand the general relative
term S is analytic for L where S and L are variables, how can we
know that the definitions for 'analytic sentence of' and 'analytic
sentences of' are not attributing two entirely different pro¬
perties to those sentences falling under the definitions? Quine
continues his argument by suggesting that we may specify as semantical
rules that such and such statements are included among the truths
and then define 'S is analytic' as 'S is true according to semantical
rules'. However, he adds that semantical rules are distinguishable
only by the fact of appearing on a page under the heading 'Semantical
Rules', and this heading is itself then meaningless. It seems to
me that the term 'semantical rules' is not meaningless, the follow¬
ing definition defines the general relative concepts 'meaning
postulates', which denotes one kind of semantical rules.
Df 3• 1• 2 A set of sentences S is the meaning postulates of a
language L iff S is stipulated for the introduction of
the terms in L and it is used in such a way that the terrms
in L are to be interpreted in such a way that sentences
in S are true for all such interpretations.
Df 3.1.3 A sentence S is analytic in the language L iff S is a
a L-consequence of the set of meaning postulates in
L.
1. Ibid., section 4, p.33 of Quine (1953).
2. Quine (1953), p.3.
3. Other general relative semantical terms such as 'interpretation
for L'cari also be defined, and then 'semantical rules for L' cai
be defined in these terms.
U P.n run n( 1 Q 'J).
Since S_ is true by stipulation, the L-consequences of S are also
true as a consequence of the use of the language, and the analy¬
tic sentences defined in Df 3• L3 are just those sentences whose
truth value can be determined by the rules for the use of the
language concerned.
(b) Some of Quine1s criticisms, e.g., Obviously any number of
classes K, M, N, etc. of statements of can be specified for
various purposes or for no purpose; what does it mean to say that
K, as against M, N, etc., is the class of the 'analytic' statements
of Lq?, and his remark that the term semantical rules is
meaningless lead Carnap to guess that Quine's criticism does not
concern the formal correctness of the definitions in pure semantics;
rather, he doubts whether there are any clear and fruitful corres-
ponding pragmatical concepts which could serve as explicanda.
Carnap calls the empirical investigations of historically given
natural languages 'pragmatic investigations'. Thus Quine's critic¬
ism is construed as: Even if an intelligible and formally
correct definition can be given for the notion analytic, it is
useless for the reason that there is no empirical, behavioristic
criterion for its application to the natural languages. In Mean¬
ing and Synonym in Natural Languages, Carnap tries to show that
such criticism is incorrect by suggesting a behavioristic, operation¬
al criterion to determine the intensions of the terms of a natural
language. Then he shows how the other semantical concepts, in
particular analytic, can be defined in terms of intension,
(c) It seems to me that the most important thesis of Two Dogmas
of Empiricism is the holistic doctrine of knowledge expounded in the
last section, and the criticism against the distinction of analytic
1. Quine (1952), p.33
r V r~•- r-- r—
synthetic sentences serves to pave the way for it. The doc trine
regards the totality of knowledge ashman-made fabric which impinges
on experience only along the edges. A conflict with experience
at the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior of the
fabric and truth values have to be redistributed over some of our
statements. However, the total fabric is so underdetermined by its
periphery that there is much latitude of choice as to what state¬
ments to reevaluate in the light of any single contrary experience.
Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic
enough adjustments else where in the system. Even logical laws may
be revised. In short, no statement is immune to revision.
Although Putnam admits that there are analytic sentences, he
accepts the holistic thesis and tries to substantiate it by the
claim that even definitions can be revised in a manner exactly
similar to that of the revision of empirical statements. He cites
Einstein's revision of 'e=ymv' as an example. His fable runs as
follows: Suppose thai kinetic energy(e) was introduced by the
sentence' e=-}mv', then' e =ymv' is true by stipulation. However,
many well-confirmed laws involving e were found afterwards and 'e'
became then a law-cluster concepts. As a result of this, the cognitive
status of 1e =ymv' changed and became falsifible. Putnam explains
that the identity of a law-cluster concept is determined by a
cluster of laws. The concept 'kinetic energy' enters into a great
many laws. These laws and the inference roles plays by the concepts
constitute its meaning collectively, but not individually. There¬
fore, in general, any one law can be abandoned without destroying
the identity of the law-cluster concept involved. It is pointed
1. Quine (l953)» P.2, 43.
2. Putnam (1962a)
3. Putnam's explanation of the way in which the identity and meaning
of the law-cluster concepts is determined by the laws is so vague
that further exposition is needed. One such supplementation is
given by Suppe in his (1977) p.74.
out that when Einstein was led by his priciple, namely all physical
laws must be Lorentz-invariant, to revise a great number of physcial
laws, 'e=|mv 1 was also revised. Putnam takes it as a distortion
of the situation to say that 'Kinetic energy={mv' was definition, and
that Einstein merely changed the definition, since, in revising it,
Einstein treated it as just another natural law, and there was a
whole set of pre-existing physical and mechanical laws which had
to be tested for compatibility with the new body of theory.
It is no doubt a distortion of the situation to say that
Einstein merely changed the definition, but it is also misleading
to say that a definition may as well be revised in a fashion exact¬
ly similar to that of the revision of empiricial laws. We can
keep the definitional nature of 'e=jmv' unchanged and describe
the situation in the following manner. Let be the set of ail
physical laws, 'D! denotes 'e=ymv~!, and M be the set of all other
sentences which are regarasd as definitional. Then Einstein's re¬
vision of D can be represented as the replacement of D by D':
e=mc +ymv+•••• In order to focus our attention on this revision,
let us assume that it is the only revision made by Einstein. If
we want to preserve the definitional character of D, the revision
in question may be reconstructed as the resultant of two steps:
(i) A new definition D (f=mc+ymv+....) is proposed, (ii) A
revision of the set of all physical laws by replacing each occurence
of 'e' in W by 1f'. The result of these two step is exactly similar
to Einsten1s except in having 'f1 to serve the function of 'e'.
From the reconstruction above, it is obvious that the revision
involves changes in both the meaning and factual dimensions of
the theory. This revision can never be represented by a change of
the definition of 'e' only, since it involves a revision of empirical
laws (step ii). However, it is not the case that a definition is
revised as if it is an empirical law. Step (ii) of the revision is
blurred by representing the revision as the replacement of D by Df,
since the step of replacing each occurence of' e', as defined by
D, by the newly defined 'f1 is achieved automatically by using
the old symbol' e' in D. It should be noted that the use of the
old symbol 'e' in a new sense, as defined by D', is practically
justifiable for the reason that the role played by fff in V is
identical to that of 'e' and 'e' becomes idle after the revision.
But this use of an old symbol in a new sense cannot be viewed
as the revision of a definition as if it is an empirical law.
This confusion is caused by the use of a single word 'revision1
for two different processes: the abandonment of meaning postulates
and the rejection of a sentence as factually false. The situation
could be improved if two words, e.g.,abandon for the abandonment
of meaning postulates and 'falsify' for the rejection of empirical
hypotheses, are used. Since we are free to change our language,
it is true that any statement may be revised in the broad sense,
including the abandonment of meaning postulates, but it is false
rhat all statements can be falsified.
(d) Since a sentence becomes analytic as a result of our stipulatio:
that certain sentences are meaning postulates, the question about
the value of regarding some sentences in a language as analytic is
basically the question about the value of taking some sentences
as meaning postulates.
The stipulation of meaning postulates is useful for at least
the following purposes: (i) The introduction of new terms for the
sake of brevity and intelligibility. (An expression which
is too long is hardly readable and intellibible in practice.)
(ii) The teaching of the use of the terms in question to new comers.
Although Putnam regards the clarification of the nature of
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logical truths, physically necessary truths in the natural sciences
and the framework principles as the most important work that a
philosopher can do,1 his acceptance of the holistic doctrine hinder
his work in this aspect. For example, accepting the holistic
doctrine, one may neglect the difference between a definition and
an empirical law and just says with a surprise that a definition
is revised in a fashion exactly similar to that of an empirical law.
However, if the place of meaning postulates in science is recognised
and preserved, we can have a better, more detailed, and more
precise account of the internal structure of scientific theories and
their revision. The revision of D in (c) serves as a very good
example.
Quine may be convinced that it would block the scientific
enterprise to declare any statement as meaning postulate, and con-
sequently immune from revision. However, this is no theoretical
reason for not accepting any meaning postulate. In principle, the
scientific enterprise could not be blocked by the stipulation
of meaning postulates. In the example above, revision to the same
effect can be accomplished with 'e=+mv2' preserved as definition,
and thus immune from falsification.
Nevertheless, although the principle 'No statement is immune
from revision' is false if understand in the sense that all state-
ment are falsifiable, it may be psychologically helpful in the
context of discovery. If one keep in mind that 'e=mv2' is a meaning
postulate, he would probably try to revise the set W of physical
l aws in other ways. However, if he imagines that' e= mv2' is an
empirical laws, it may be easier for him to find out that an accept-
3.ble new theory can be obtained by changing 'e=1mv2' to 'e=mc2+
1 mv2+..... '9 a change which is the resultant of an alteration of a
neaning postulate and a revision of the set of empirical laws.
I. Putnam (1962a).
The ObservationalTheoretical Distinction
The observational-theoretical term distinction is another
major target of the criticisms against the Received View which may
be applicable to our program as well. Spector indicates that the
following two assumptions are incorporated into the Received View:
(i) The dual language assumption in looking at an unreconstruct-
ed theory, we can distinguish in general two classes of terms,
the observation terms and the theoretical (non-observation) terms.
'Theoretical' and 'observation(al)' are taken as denoting mutually
exclusive categories of terms (as well as the nonlinguistic entities
to which they refer so-called observable and theoretical objects,
properties, events, etc.)
(ii) When we come to reconstruct a theory, those non-logical constant:
of the calculus which represent the observation terms of the un-
reconstructed theory are the only ones which can be given semantical
rule s.
Various attempts have been made to show that the terms in L
cannot be dichotomized into two classes, one observational and the
other theoretical. However, as it is pointed out by Suppe and
Hempel already, they missed the point- of the Received View. Since
Lr is a language used in actual practice, it suffers from the
same shortcomings, such as ambiguity, vagueness etc., as the ordinary
languages. So it is the function of rational reconstruction to dis-
tinguish the various uses of the components in L and incorporate
them into our reconstructed language L, hoping that the cognitive
status of expressions and theories formulated in L would be crystal
clear. Thus, strictly speaking, the observational/theoretical
1. Spector (1966), p.1, 2.
2. Ibid., Achinstein (1965), Putnam (1962).
Suppe (1977), p.83, 247
distinction is made within the reconstructed language L. Further¬
more, Carnap points out that the choice of the form of reconstruct¬
ion depends to some extent upon the interpretation which we wish
to give to the term, and this interpretation is not uniquely deter-
mined by the accepted formulations in science, This strengthens
our point the distinction is made within L,
A comparison of our definitions of 0-terms, T-terms etc. with
thesis (ii) above will show that it is an assumption of our program
neither. In section 1,2,4, those terms which are introduced either
ostensively or defined by a molecular definition chain of L are
called 0-terms, and in section 2.33 the term of T for which no
interpretation are given are called T-terms, Since language is
conventional, we may interpret any term if we like. It is not
prohibited that the T-terms may be given an interpretation, but if
we extend our I subsequently to interpret a term t in T, e.g., our
subsequent ostensive interpretation of the term 'crobe1, t becomes
thus an O-term. For terms of L, those part of their usage which
correspond to the use of a T-term may be called theoretical use. And
in order that L may be cognitively illuminating in the sense of
CArr 6, the theoretical usage of a term should be explicated as
a T-term, Thus (i) and (ii) are no criticism of our program.
Furthermore, I would like to emphasize that L is not a stable
language incapable of development. As our knowledge and technology
advance, the means that can be used for the ostensive definition
of 0-terms increase, and more T-terms can be seinantically interpretec
Thus our distinction between T-terms and non-T-terms shifts with
time as science and technology advance.'
1, Carnap (1956), p.66,
2, It should be noted that the terms in L are not diehotomizee
into the 0-terms and T-terms, there are 0''-terms which art
neither 0-terms nor T-terms.
3, Cf. Spector1s criticism of Maxwell in (1966), p.5-12.
3• 3 Some Research Programs
(a.) The study of the Structure of Actual Scientific Theories
In order to determine the cognitive status of expressions in
actual scientific theories, we have to give them rational recon¬
structions, However, the language L exhibited in this paper is so far
only a language schema for the general language of empirical
science. It pays little attention to the detailed internal structures
of actual theories and their relations between each other. Since
our theories are usually developed on the basis of previously
accepted theories and the terms of a new theory are introduced
on the basis of both the O-terms and old T-terms, the study of the
relations between the new terms and the old terms is an important
part of our investigation about the structure of actual scientific
theories, The theoreticalnontheoretical terms distinction
advanced by Putnam and Tuomela, and the theoreticalantecedent
vocabulary distinction advanced by Hempel are useful for this study,
(b) The Application of Mathematics in Empirical Sciences
As is pointed out in section 1. 3• 1 i our program concerning
the determination of the cognitive status of expressions in empirical
science is incomplete without an adequate analysis of the applica¬
tion of mathematics in science,
(c) The Study of Ostensive Definition and the Thing Language
The development of physcial and physiological theory of per¬
ception urges for an analysis of the structure and cognitive status
of the thing language and thereby terms introduced by ostensive
definitions. This would enhance our understanding of the cognitive
status of expressions in l.
1, Putnam (1962)5 Tuomela (1973)9 P.16, 17; Suppe(l977) p.23.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Achinstein, P.
1963. Theoretical Terms and Partial Interpretation, British
Journal for Philosophy of Science, 14, 89-105.
1964. On the Meaning of Scientific Terms, Journal of Philosophy
61, 497-510.
1965. The Problem of Theoretical Terms, American Philosophical
Quarterly, 2, 193-203.
1968. Concepts of Science. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press.
1969. The Legacy of Logical Positivism. Baltimore, Md.: Johns
Hopkins Press.
Braithwaite, R. B.
1953. Scientific Explanation. New York: Harper Torchbooks.
Bunge, M.
1969. What are Physical Theories About?, American Philosophical
Quarterly, Monograph Series, no. 3, pp. 61-91.
Camap, Rudolf
1936-37. Testability and Meaning, in Ammerman: Classics of
Analytic Philosophy, McGraw-Hill, Inc., New York.
1939. Poundations of Logic and Mathematics. Chicago, 111.:
University of Chicago Press.
1950. Logical Poundations of Probability. Chicago, 111.:
University of Chicago Press; 2nd rev. ed., 1962.
1950a. Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology, Revue Internationale
de Philosophle, 11, 208-228; reprinted in Linsky (1952)
and the enlarged 1956 edition of Carnap (1947).
1952. Meaning Postulates, Philosophical Studies. 3, 65-73.
1955. Meaning and Synonymy in Natural Languages, Philosophical
Studies» 6. 33-47.
1956. "The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts,"
in Feigl. H., and M. Scriven: Minnesota Studies in the
Philosophy of Science, Vol I. Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, pp.33-76.
1956a. Meaning and Necessity. Chicago, Ill.: University of
Chicago Press; enlarged ed.
1963. Carl G. Hempel on Scientific Theories, in Schllpp: The
Philosophy of Rudolf Camap. LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court,
pp. 958-966.
1963a. Physical Language as the Universal Language of Science,"
in Alston, W., and G. Nakhnikian: Readings in Twentieth
Century Philosophy. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.
1963b. Intellectual Autobiography, in Schilpp: The Philosophy
of Rudolf Carnap. LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, pp. 3-84.
1963c. Replies and Systematic Expositions, in Schilpp: The
Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court,
pp. 859-1013.
1966. Philosophical Foundations of Physics. New York: Basic
Books.
Grice, H.P., and P.F. Strawson
1956. "In Defense of a Dogma," Philosophical Review, 65, 141-
158.
Hempel, C.G.
1950. "Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of
Meaning," Revue Internationale de Philosophie. 11, 41-63,
reprinted in Linsky (1952): Semantics and the Philosophy
of Language. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
1952. Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science.
Chicago, 111.: University of Chicago Press.
1963. Implications of Carnap's Work for the Philosophy of
Science, in Schilpp: The Philosophy of Rndolf Camap.
LaSalle, 111.: Open Court®
1965. Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays in
the Philosophy of Science® New York: Free Press.
1965a. Empiricist Criteria of Cognitive Significance: Problems
and Changes, pp. 101-133 in Hempel (1965).
1970. On the fStandard Conception' of Scientific Theories,
in Radner, M., and S, Winokur: Minnesota Studies in the
Philosophy of Science. Vol. IV. Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota. Press.
1973. The Meaning of Theoretical Terms: A Critique of the
Standard Empiricist Construal, pp.367-378 in P. Suppes,
L. Eenkin, A. Joja, G.R.C. Moisil (eds.), Logic,
Methodology and Philosophy of Science IV, Amsterdam:
North-Holland.
Maxwell, G-.
1962 The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities, in
Feigl, E., and G. Maxwell: Minnesota Studies in the
Philosophy of Science, Vol. III. Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, pp. 3-27.
1962a. The Necessary and the Contingent, in Feigl,H., and G.
Maxwell (1962), pp. 398-404.
1970. Structural Realism and the Meaning of Theoretical Terms
in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science.
Vol. IV. eds. S. Winokur and M. Radner. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
Nagel, E.
1961. The Structure of Science. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
Przelecki, M.
1969. The Logic of Empirical Theories. Routledge and Kegan Paul
93
1976 . Interpretationof Theoretical Terms : In Defence of an
Empiricist Dogma , in Formal Methods in the Methodology
of EmpiricalSciences. eds . M . Przelecki, K . Szaniawski,
and R . Wojcicki. Dordrecht: D . Reidel, pp . 158 - 169 .
Przelecki, M . , and R . Wojcicki
1969 . The Problem of Analyticity, Synthese19 , 374 - 399 .
Putnam, H .
1962 . What TheoriesAre Not , in Nagel , E . , P . Suppes, and
A . Tarski : Logic , Methodology, and Philosophyof Science :
Proceedings of the 1960 International Congress . Standford ,
Calif . : StandfordUniversityPress , pp . 240 - 251 .
1962 a . The Analyticand the Synthetic, - - in Feigl , H . , and
G . Maxwell : Minnesota Studies in the Philosophyof Science ,
Vol . III . Minneapolis: University of MinnesotaPress ,
pp . 350 - 3970
Quine, W . V . 0 .
1951 . Two Dogmas of Empiricism, PhilosophicalReview , 60 ,
20 - 43 , reprintedin Quine ( 1953 ) .
1953 . From a Logical Point of View . Cambridge, Mass . : Harvard
UniversityPress . 2 nd ed . , 1962 .
1970 . Philosophyof Logic . EnglewoodCliffs : Prentice - Hall ,
Ramsey, F .
1931 . Theories , in The Foundationsof Mathematicsand other
Logical Essays , London : Kegan Paul New York : Harcourt
Brace .
Rozeboom, W .
1960 . Studies in the Empiricist Theory of Scientific Meaning
I - II , in Philosophyof Science27 , 359 - 3730
1963 . The Factual Content of TheoreticalConcepts , in Feig 1 ,
H . , and G . Maxwell( eds . ) , MinnesotaS udiesin the
Philosophy of Science III , University of Minnesota Press ,
Minneapolis, ppp . 273 - 357 .
94
1970. "The Crisis in Philosophical Semantics", in Radner, M.,
and S. Winokur (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy
of Science IV, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, pp. 196-219.
Schaffner, K. F.
1969. "Correspondence Rules", Philosophy of Science 36, 280-290.
Schilpp, P.
1963. The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. LaSalle Ill.: Open Court.
Spector, M.
1966. "Theory and Observation I-II," The British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science 7, 1-20, 89-104,
Suppe, Frederick
1971." On Partial Interpretation," Journal of Philosophy, 68,
57-76.
1977. The Structure of Scientific Theories. University of
Illinois Press, Chicago, 2nd ed.
Suppes, P.
1968. "The Desirability of Formalization in Science," Journal
of Philosophy, 65, 651-664.
Tuomela, Raimo
1973• Theoretical Concepts. Springer-verlag/wien.
Minnie, J.A.
1967. "The Implicit Definition of Theoretical Terms," The
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18, 223-229.


